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ARTICLES
"YER OUTTA HERE!"
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL EX-
CLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
Stephen D. Easton*
It does not take long for even a casual observer of criminal
and civil trials to make two observations about expert witness-
es. The first of these observations comes almost immediately:
experts are vitally important to the judicial process. In many
trials, the outcome largely depends upon which set of impres-
sively credentialed1 experts the jurors2 (and the judge) be-
* Partner, Pearce & Durick, PLLP, Bismarck, North Dakota. J.D., 1983, Stan-
ford Law School Former United States Attorney for the District of North Dakota.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Tony Weiler, the
word processing efforts of Evelyn Froebe and June Hintz, the proofreading of Heather
Wurtz, and the editorial assistance of those who reviewed drafts of this article, in-
cluding Marivern Easton, Nick Chase, and Julie Oseid. All opinions and mistakes are
exclusively the responsibility of the author.
1. One commentator who has significant experience with experts refers to them
as "academically endowed superwitness[es]." Terry O'Reilly, Ethics and Experts, 59 J.
Am L. & CoA. 113, 113 (1993).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (ob-
serving that scientific (polygraph) evidence "is likely to be shrouded with an aura of
near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi"); United States v. Addison, 498
F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that expert testimony may "assume a posture
of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"); White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp.
851, 858 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (opining that when a psychiatrist's prediction regarding a
person's future dangerousness "is proffered by a witness bearing the title of 'Doctor,'
its impact on the jury is much greater than if it were not masquerading as some-
thing it is not"), affd, 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983); James E. Starrs, Frye v. United
States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal To Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702,
115 F.RD. 92, 92 (1987) ("Almost as if it were a shibboleth, it has been said and
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lieve.4 The second observation generally comes later than the
first: a significant amount of shoddy "science," phony logic,
faulty analysis, sleight of hand, and other assorted junk enters
the courtroom dressed up in the emperor's clothes of expert
testimony.'
Although the second observation generally does not come as
quickly as the first, those who know and care about the Ameri-
can justice system usually do come to realize both the danger6
and the frequency of unsound expert testimony. Trial attor-
neys,7 judges,' academics,9 and even non-lawyers 0 have be-
resaid that trial juries give overweening deference to scientific evidence, regardless of
its validity within the scientific community ... . That the appellate courts have rou-
tinely manifested a thorough-going skepticism of the jury's ability to cope with the
complexities of scientific evidence is well-documented.") (footnote omitted).
One legal scholar who is frequently cited on expert witness issues has observed:
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more
accurate and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientif-
ic evidence visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise mea-
surement, of findings arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short,
in the mind of the typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a special
aura of credibility.
Edward J. Inwinkeiried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific
Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 37 (Edward J. Inwinkeiried ed.,
1981), quoted in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 n.8 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
3. See United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir. 1991).
The remainder of this article will assume that juries are the fact finders in
cases involving expert testimony. This assumption is adopted merely for the conve-
nience of eliminating the necessity of repeatedly referring to "the jury or the judge."
In reality, issues regarding the admissibility of expert testimony also arise in bench
trials and other proceedings before judges that do not involve juries.
4. Battles among experts are critical in both civil and criminal trials. See KEN-
NETH R& FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1997) ("In the courtroom, the outcomes of criminal, paterni-
ty, first amendment, and civil liability cases (among others) often turn on scientific
evidence, the reliability of which may be hotly contested."); Thomas Lyons, Convincing
a Reluctant Judge to Hold a Pretrial Daubert Hearing, TRIALS & TRIBULATIONS,
Spring 1997, at 7 ("In litigation today expert testimony is often critical, if not deter-
minative."); Kenneth E. Melson, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules on Admis-
sibility of Scientific Evidence: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 115 F.R.D. 126, 126 (1987)
("Scientific evidence plays an ever-increasing and important role in prosecutor's cases,
and prosecutors view it as an effective tool in taking a bite out of crime.").
5. A court rejecting an experienced expert's testimony declared that the experts
"well-traveled opinions are no more than educated guesses dressed up in evening
clothes." Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1407 (D. Or. 1996).
6. See Jonathon M. Hoffman, A Briefcase and an Opinion: Post- Daubert' Expert
Testimony-A Major Shift, 22 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 379, 388 (BNA) (Apr. 8,
1994) ("Bogus science is likely worse than no science at all.").
7. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EX-
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moaned the frequency with which litigants seek to present
TENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISES IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY
AND AFFORDABILITY 35 (Feb. 1986) ("It has become all too common for 'experts' or
'studies' on the fringe of or even well beyond the outer parameters of mainstream sci-
entific or medical views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from which con-
clusions may be drawn.'), quoted in Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reason-
ably Reliable'? Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology under Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 351 n.1 (1992); O'Reilly, supra note
1, at 124 (asserting that "the well qualified expert whose opinion challenges accepted
wisdom, or worse, who uses the same data as the opposing experts to reach opposite
conclusions" is 'the problem every Court faces").
Of course, the trial attorneys' lament about the power of unscrupulous experts
is at least somewhat hypocritical. As one experienced trial attorney has observed-
Good lawyers "win' cases by obtaining the best result for their clients.
Less successful lawyers fade from the arena. We accept this as the harsh
code of trial work. Inevitably this requires the search for the most per-
suasive experts and their early retention, regardless of the costs. If this
is now a lumbering Frankenstein, the truth is that you and I tightened
all the screws and turned on the electricity.
O'Reilly, supra note 1, at 117.
8. See, e.g., Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1993)
("Like the Fifth Circuit, we are unprepared to agree that 'it is so if an expert says it
is so.") (citing Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1987)); Chaulk
by Murphy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (-'There is hardly anything not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot
now be proved by some so-called "experts.') (quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St.
Louis RB., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899)); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Or-
leans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Ihe professional expert is now
commonplace. That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting with at-
torneys and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions are avail-
able to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law, before a jury,
and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he is an 'expert."); In re
Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1506-07 (D. Kan. 1995)
("Dr. Hoyt's analysis is driven by a desire to enhance the measure of plaintiffs' dam-
ages, even at the expense of well-accepted scientific principles and methodology.');
Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P. 1990) (quoting Air Crash
Disaster and rejecting proffered testimony by experts who were "'available to the
highest bidder"); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICHL L. REV.
473, 482 (1986) ("An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual
theory, no matter how frivolous .. . ).
9. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evi-
dence, 115 F.R.D. 89, 91 (1987) ("It is quite apparent that experts are readily avail-
able to present essentially frivolous theories ... .'); Michael IL Graham, Expert Wit-
ness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of
Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 44; McCarthy, supra note 7, at 350 ("Com-
mentators and courts agree on the need for greater control over the use of expert
testimony in the courtroom.').
10. See, eg., FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 17; PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGA-
TION EXPLOSION 152-66 (1991); Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES,
July 8, 1991, at 68.
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faulty expert testimony, and the potential power of such testi-
mony to lead to incorrect decisions." Almost every attorney
who has tried at least one lawsuit has felt (and at least occa-
sionally followed) the urge to demand that the court throw
unscrupulous experts out of court. Most judges have been
tempted to exercise the baseball umpire's prerogative of looking
the offender in the eye, pointing to the nearest exit, and shout-
ing, "Yer outta here!"
Although the reality of faulty expert testimony is widely
recognized, the identification of which expert testimony should
be disallowed is a hazardous and ill-defined enterprise. Un-
sound expert testimony tends to be akin to hard core pornogra-
phy: Lawyers and judges "know it when (they) see it,"' but
they have not been able to define clear criteria for identifying
it.
13
11. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Indeed, unreliable scientific evidence is widely acknowledged to be prejudicial.');
CHARLES A. WEiGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 22 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PaOCE-
DURE § 5217 (1978) ("Scientific and technical evidence has great potential for mislead-
ing the jury. The low probative worth can often be concealed in the jargon of some
expert or masked by the use of technical paraphernalia."); Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. Unites States, A Half-Century Lat-
er, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1237 (1980) (The major danger of scientific evidence is
its potential to mislead the jury;, an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evi-
dence and thus lead the jury to accept it without careful scrutiny."); Weinstein, supra
note 8, at 482 ("Juries and judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the expert-
for-hire.").
12. In an often referenced, but surprisingly seldom cited, passage, Justice Stewart
outlined his test for hard core pornography.
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by
negative implication in the Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts, that
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area
are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
13. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 22 ("Judges can-and will-take their
best shot at an answer."); O'Reilly, supra note 1, at 125 (noting that "there are few
guidelines" for court examination of the validity of the bases of expert opinions); cf
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 598
(1988) (noting the need for reform in court analysis of proposed expert testimony and
observing "there is no consensus on how to achieve these objectives"); Starrs, supra
note 2, at 93 (observing that judges "need guidance in the reception of scientific evi-
dence").
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This article will attempt to fill this breach, by articulating a
set of standards that are extracted from federal court opinions
which have excluded faulty expert testimony. Part I discusses
the importance of the judge's decision to allow or exclude opin-
ion testimony. Part HI reviews changing judicial attitudes about
expert testimony, which increase the prospects that a judge will
disallow expert testimony. Part I outlines the standards for
excluding expert testimony in a series of questions that attor-
neys and judges should ask about proffered opinions. Applica-
tion of these standards will bring order to the often undisci-
plined process of analyzing the validity of expert testimony.
I. THE STAKES: THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Quite a bit is at stake when judges contemplate whether to
allow or exclude expert testimony. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, expert witnesses are given wide latitude in formulat-
ing their opinions. Furthermore, in certain cases, a party must
present expert testimony to create a triable issue of fact. Even
when expert testimony is not technically required, a party often
has little chance of success without it. As a result of these
stakes, the parties and the court must review carefully the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony.
A. The Rules of Evidence Give Favorable Treatment to Experts
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, experts are given the
authority to do things that are strictly forbidden for lay wit-
nesses. The permissive nature of expert witness law, therefore,
allows parties to bring matters before the jury through expert
testimony that might otherwise be inadmissible.
The common misunderstanding is that experts are allowed to
testify about their opinions, and lay witnesses are forbidden
from testifying about their opinions. The actual boundaries of
permissible testimony for experts and lay witnesses are some-
what less mutually exclusive, but ultimately even more favor-
able to experts, than this common misunderstanding. Rules 701,
702, and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence establish these
boundaries.
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Under Rule 701, lay witnesses are allowed to testify about
their opinions. The opinions or inferences of lay witnesses,
however, are admissible only when they are "rationally based
on the perception of the witness." 4
The boundaries for the opinions of expert witnesses are far
less restrictive. Under Rule 702, experts are allowed to testify
"in the form of an opinion or otherwise" whenever "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue."15 This is broad territory indeed.'6 As a practical matter,
it may be almost boundless. A wise trial attorney is not likely
to risk incurring the wrath of the jury and the judge by at-
tempting to offer expert evidence that is not at least arguably
helpful in the determination of a fact in issue. Furthermore, the
license to help the fact finder "understand evidence" is an invi-
tation that an experienced expert witness will be anxious to ex-
ploit.
In addition, the expert, unlike the fact witness, need not
limit her opinions to those based on her own observations.'7 To
the contrary, Rule 703 allows her to base her opinions on facts
or data "made known to the expert at or before the hearing.""
These "facts or data" can even include inadmissible evidence,
such as hearsay. 9 Moreover, because the facts or data can be
14. FED. R. EVID. 701(a). Rule 701 also states that lay witness opinions and infer-
ences are admissible only when they are "helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 701(b). This
provision does not meaningfully limit lay witness opinion testimony. Any lay witness
opinion testimony that meets the general relevance test of Rule 401 is presumably at
least somewhat helpful to the determination of a fact in issue.
15. FED. R. EVD. 702.
16. Except in cases where the ultimate issue of fact is the mental condition of
the defendant, the allowable territory for expert witness opinion testimony includes
opinions about the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. See FED. R. EVID.
:704; discussion infra Parts EI.N, 1LO.
17. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) ("Unlike
an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opin-
ions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See
Rules 702 and 703.").
18. FED. R. EVD. 703. Of course, the expert, like the fact witness, can base opin-
ions on her own observations. See id. (allowing an expert to rely upon the facts or
data "perceived by" the expert).
19. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (stating that "the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence").
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presented to the expert outside of the hearing, a trial attorney
can legitimately present the precise set of "facts or data" that
the expert needs to reach the opinion the attorney needs, in
private!
The only restriction is that the facts or data the expert relies
upon must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject.' ° Once again, the Rules attempt to provide a restric-
tion that, unless aggressively and creatively enforced by oppos-
ing counsel and the court,2 is largely vacuous. The expert will
undoubtedly freely volunteer that she has based her opinions
on valid data and facts.' It is almost impossible to imagine an
expert witness testifying that, although she relied upon certain
facts and data, none of her colleagues would ever rely upon
such facts and data.
These liberal provisions regarding expert witnesses, standing
alone, make the court's determination of whether an expert will
be allowed to testify a monumentous one. If the witness is
allowed to serve as an expert, the trial attorney and the party
that hired her will be allowed to present information through
the expert that they could never dream about otherwise getting
to the jury. This information may even include hearsay and
other inadmissible evidence, as long as that hearsay is incorpo-
rated into the expert witnesses' "opinion(s) or inferences.' All
of this leeway is lost, however, if the court excludes the expert
testimony.
B. For Some Litigants, Expert Testimony Is a Necessity
In some instances, even more is at stake when the court
decides whether to exclude expert testimony. When the law or
practical realities require expert testimony, an expert who can
20. Id.
21. For discussion of efforts to put teeth into this restriction, see infra Parts
ILC.4, IILS.
22. At least one court has found that declarations by experts that their methodol-
ogy was "usually and generally followed by physicians and scientists" was enough to
shield the experts' testimony from exclusion by the trial court. Joiner v. General Elec.
Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996), reu'd, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
23. FDD. X. EVID. 703.
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survive attempts to exclude her testimony is a requirement, not
a luxury.
In some areas of tort law, plaintiffs must present expert
testimony to survive motions for summary judgment. Products
liability law provides perhaps the most prominent examples of
mandatory expert testimony. In many cases, courts have first
determined that a plaintiffs proffered expert testimony regard-
ing product defect or injury causation was inadmissible, then
dismissed the underlying actions.' In a similar vein, courts in
environmental torts cases have excluded expert testimony that
attempted to tie plaintiffs' injuries to environmental hazards
and then dismissed the underlying actions.'s In medical or oth-
er professional malpractice actions based upon the law of some
states, plaintiffs must present admissible expert testimony
about the standard of care and the defendant's failure to meet
this standard.' In still other cases, the exclusion of expert
24. See, e.g., Sorensen by Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 639 (8th Cir.
1994) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony regarding allegedly defective chemically-
treated alfalfa tablets and thereby affirming summary judgment of dismissal); Porter
v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming exclusion of expert
medical testimony regarding damages allegedly caused from ingestion of buprofen
and thereby affirming summary judgment of dismissal); Estate of Mitchell v. Gencorp,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592 (D. Kan. 1997) (excluding expert testimony and granting sum-
mary judgment of dismissal); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (S.D.
FIl. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs expert testimony regarding causation and granting
summary judgment of dismissal); Stalnaker v. General Motors Corp., 934 F. Supp.
179, 181 (D. Md. 1996) (excluding plaintiffs expert testimony regarding alleged prod-
uct defect and causation, then granting defendant's motion for summary judgment),
affld, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 852 F. Supp.
933, 948 (D. Kan. 1994) (excluding expert testimony and granting defendant's re-
newed motion for judgment of dismissal), affd, 70 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).
25. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirm-
ing exclusion of expert testimony and thereby affirming summary judgment of dis-
missal due to plaintiffs' failure to establish causal link between work place chemical
exposure and injuries); Cuevas v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp.
1306, 1313 (S.D. Miss. 1997) ("[Slince the defective condition and causation opinion of
the plaintiffs' expert witnesses is inadmissible, the Court must grant the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment."); In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proc., 927 F. Supp. 834,
870 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("Plaintiffs have neither presented direct evidence that they were
exposed to doses of radiation greater than 10 reins, nor have they presented indirect
evidence capable of supporting the inference that they were exposed to cancer induc-
ing levels of radiation. Accordingly, the court will grant Defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment in its entirety."); Trail v. Civil Eng'r. Corps, 849 F. Supp. 766, 768
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (excluding expert evidence regarding health effects of contamina-
tion and granting summary judgment of dismissal).
26. See 1 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA §§ 2.41, 2.42 (Richard M. Patterson ed.,
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testimony also has led to summary judgment because expert
testimony was needed to create a material factual issueY In
any case where expert testimony is required as a matter of law,
the court's decision regarding whether to exclude expert testi-
mony may decide the entire case.
Even when expert testimony is not technically required,s it
may be necessary as a practical matter. For example, a prose-
cutor who must tie the defendant to the scene of the crime
without the benefit of eyewitness testimony may need to pres-
ent DNA or other scientific evidence, establishing the link be-
tween the defendant and the crime scene. A criminal defense
attorney who has just watched the prosecutor present such
evidence had better be ready with her own expert witness testi-
mony establishing doubts about the reliability of the
prosecutor's evidence. A plaintiffs attorney in a negligence
action arising out of a severe automobile collision where respon-
sibility for causing the accident is hotly contested may not tech-
nically be "required" to present expert testimony, but she will
stand little chance of success without an accident
reconstructionist's explanation of how the accident happened.
Once she presents this expert testimony, only a foolhardy de-
fense attorney would rest on the burden of proof rather than
present her own accident reconstruction expert to explain the
defendant's version of the accident's dynamics.' In any such
4th ed. 1996); RoNALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SmTH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 32.16
(4th ed. 1996).
27. See, e.g., Sales v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305, 311 (5th Cir. 1992) (excluding
expert testimony about defendant's alleged deliberate indifference and conscious disre-
gard for the plaintiffs safety, then directing entry of summary judgment of dismissal);
Zarecki v. National RIR Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. L 1996); Collier
v. Varco-Pruden Bldgs., 911 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D.S.C. 1995) ('The court finds [the
expert's opinion] to be too speculative to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the oil on the panels was a patent danger.").
28. Although there are cases where the law requires the presentation of expert
witness testimony, such circumstances are admittedly rather unusual. In what cer-
tainly must be the majority of cases, the law does not require expert testimony. See,
e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) ("Nor was it error to fail
to require 'expert' affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene when the
materials themselves were actually placed in evidence.").
29. Even when expert witness testimony may not really be needed, parties and
their attorneys often feel the need to call expert witnesses. One commentator who is
familiar with the realities of life in the modern expert-driven courtroom has noted
that 'the trial attorney [is] often vulnerable to the very real fear that he must have
an expert on any given subject, no matter how obvious, or run the risk that his
19981
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instance, a successful motion to exclude expert testimony can
effectively, if not technically, gut an opponent's case.
C. In Some Instances, Exclusion of One Expert's Testimony Can
Lead to the Exclusion of Other Expert Testimony
Occasionally, a "domino effect" may occur whereby more than
the testimony of a single expert is at stake when a party seeks
to exclude that expert's testimony. When a litigant plans to call
numerous expert witnesses, the testimony of several expert wit-
nesses may be based upon the conclusions of a single expert
witness. If the critical expert's testimony is excluded, the testi-
mony of the other experts may also be excluded.'o
II. JuDIcIAL AT1TrUDES: A RECENT SHIFT
As the discussion in Part I documents, the court's decision
about whether to admit or exclude proffered expert testimony
is, in various instances, significant, important, critical, or even
cataclysmic. Perhaps because they knew a party would suffer so
much if expert testimony was excluded, judges, until quite re-
cently, have been reluctant to do so. Guidance, however, from
opponent will call such an expert and the case will be lost." O'Reilly, supra note 1,
at 121.
30. See, e.g., Dennis v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.N.J.
1996) ("Defendants' position with regard to Glucksberg is simply 'the foundation for
Dr. Glucksberg's opinion is illusory ... [because his] entire testimony rests on the
opinions of... Drs. Kroemer and Thompson.'... In light of the court's previous
findings [excluding the testimony of these two experts] and the absence of any discus-
sion demonstrating the independent reliability of Glucksberg's report, the court is
compelled to exclude Dr. Glucksberg's testimony."); Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands
Corp., 163 FI.RD. 237, 247 (D.V.L 1995) ("We conclude, therefore, that Dr.
Copemann's statement limiting plaintiffs post-injury earnings to the minimum wage
or slightly greater was unreliable and lacked an adequate factual foundation under
FarD. &L [EVID.] 702 and 703.... Rule 703 permits us to look behind Professor Rob-
erts testimony to the underlying data supporting his calculations. Since Professor
Roberts' built his wage loss edifice on Dr. Copemann's unfounded conclusions about
plaintiffs post-injury earning capacity, his testimony on economic damages was itself
unreliable and thus inadmissible."); cf National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Che.
Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1526-27 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ("The plaintiffs' other four causation
experts have relied to varying degrees upon the opinions and publications of those
two.").
EXPERT TESTIMONY
no less an authority than the United States Supreme Court is
starting to change this judicial reluctance.
A. The Traditional View: Admit Expert Opinions "For Whatever
They Are Worth"
Until quite recently, a party that sought to exclude expert
testimony on almost any ground, no matter how solid, was
quite likely to have the judge allow the expert to testify."'
While rejecting the party's motion in limine or other objection
to the opposing expert's testimony, the judge would usually
state that the objections merely "went to the weight of the
testimony," not to its admissibility," or that the testimony
would be admitted "for whatever it is worth," leaving for the
jurors the determination of what the testimony was indeed
worth."
The judicial reluctance to exclude expert testimony might be
explained by district court fear of reversal. Trial judges might
have believed that a decision excluding any evidence offered by
a party might increase the chances of a successful appeal."
31. As recently as 1993, one commentator noted that the "exclusion of experts
does occur .... but these cases are very much in the minority." O'Reilly, supra note
1, at 121.
32. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir.
1991) ("As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an experts
opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and
should be left for the jury's consideration."); Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d
420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) ('The district court should, initially, approach its inquiry
with the proper deference to the jury's role as the arbiter of disputes between con-
flicting opinions. As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an
expert's opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissi-
bility and should be left for the jury's consideration."); United States v. Roark, 753
F.2d 991 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing testimony from a psychologist about whether the
defendant meant what she said when she confessed because objections to the testimo-
ny went to weight rather than admissibility).
33. See, eg., Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 21
(1st Cir. 1992) ("Richmond correctly states that we have upheld the admissibility of
maladroit 'expert' testimony on the ground that it was for the jury to determine the
witness' credibility."); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230,
1233 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e recognize the temptation to answer objections to receipt of
expert testimony with the short-hand remark that the jury will give it 'the weight it
deserves.' This nigh reflexive reaction may be sound in some cases . .. ."); cf. Roark,
753 F.2d at 994 (reversing due to exclusion of expert testimony because "[wihether
Dr. Cabrera-Mendez's testimony will be persuasive is for the jury').
34. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 387 (noting that "tria judges formerly believed
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1
After all, it is quite easy for a judge to expect a party who
loses a trial to put the blame for this loss squarely on excluded
evidence, which will be portrayed on appeal as the one critical
piece of evidence that would have swayed the jury. It seems
more difficult for a party who loses at trial after an unsuccess-
ful motion to exclude her opponent's evidence to point to one
piece of evidence that was introduced, along with many other
pieces of evidence, as the one critical piece that destroyed her
case.
If judicial reluctance to exclude faulty expert evidence did
indeed result from concerns about reversal, these concerns have
not been well placed. Although an industrious researcher can
find an occasional case reversing a trial court for excluding
expert testimony,' the casebooks are full of appellate court
decisions reiterating that trial courts have significant discretion
in making decisions about expert witnesses, and that these
decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discre-
tion."6 Despite this appellate court reluctance to second guess
that the yellow brick road on the path to affirmance lay in the admission of border-
line testimony").
35. See Roback v. V.LP. Transp., Inc., 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Diallo, 40 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1994); Roark, 753 F.2d at 996.
36. See, e.g., Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1996) (Because
"the decision to allow or to exclude expert testimony is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the district court," the appellate court will not reverse unless the district
court findings were manifestly erroneous.); United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757
(7th Cir. 1996) ("Rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony are entitled to the
same deference as evidentiary rulings generally."); Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50
F.3d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[A]ppellant's contentions overlook the wide range of
discretion accorded to trial courts in these matters."); United States v. Marsh, 26
F.3d 1496, 1502 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We review for abuse of discretion the district court's
refusal to allow an expert witness to testify regarding a witness's psychiatric condi-
tion."); Taylor v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 8 F.3d 584, 585 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The district
court has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony and we will not dis-
turb its ruling unless it is 'manifestly erroneous."); United States v. Cantrell, 999
F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1993) (similar); United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1103
(9th Cir. 1993) ("A trial court's exclusion of expert testimony is reviewed for manifest
error or abuse of discretion."); United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhere has been one recurrent tide coursing through the cases: the ad-
missibility of (expert) evidence is generally best left to trial judges."); United States v.
Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Trial courts have broad discretion over
whether to admit or exclude such [expert] evidence, and their rulings will be upheld
absent an abuse of that discretion."); Acoustical Design, Inc. v. Control Elec. Co., 932
F.2d 939, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (similar); Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 920 F.2d
1185, 1187 (4th Cir. 1990) (similar); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1381
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the decisions of the trial court judges who were in the best
position to evaluate expert testimony,"7 trial court judges re-
mained reluctant to seriously consider excluding such testimo-
ny.
B. The Post-Daubert View: As Gatekeepers, Judges Must
Exclude Faulty Expert Opinions
Although a party seeking to exclude expert testimony still
faces an uphill battle under the liberal Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the steepness of that hill has been reduced somewhat in
recent years. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court re-
minded district court judges, in no uncertain terms, that they
have a responsibility under the Rules to evaluate all evidence,
including expert testimony, and to exclude invalid evidence.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,-' the Su-
preme Court instructed district court judges that Rule 104(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence39 requires them to make prelim-
inary determinations regarding the "reliability," and therefore
the admissibility, of expert testimony 4° The Court outlined the
(9th Cir. 1984) ("On review, our Court will reverse only if the District Court abused
its wide discretion or committed 'manifest error' in excluding that kind of testimo-
ny.").
37. It is interesting to note that some appellate courts reversing the admission of
expert testimony refused to grant the usual deference to trial courts precisely because
they believed that the trial courts had refused to seriously consider whether the ex-
pert testimony should have been considered. One frequently cited decision stated:
In sum, we adhere to the deferential standard for review of deci-
sions regarding the admission of expert testimony by experts. Neverthe-
less, we take this occasion to caution that the standard leaves appellate
judges with a considerable task. We will turn to that task with a sharp
eye, particularly in those instances, hopefully few, where the record
makes it evident that the decision to receive expert testimony was simply
tossed off to the jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy. Our message to
our able trial colleagues: it is time to take hold of expert testimony in
federal trials.
Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d at 1234; accord Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999
F.2d 549, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 922-
23 (D.P.R. 1990).
38. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
39. Rule 104(a) provides, in part, "Preliminary questions concerning the qualifi-
cations of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court... . FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
40. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 ("Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening
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decision that trial courts must make regarding expert testimo-
ny:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then,
the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federaljudges possess the capacity to undertake this review.4'
In outlining this "gatekeeping role"' for trial court judges, the
Supreme Court noted that trial court judges must exercise even
"more control over expert witnesses than over lay witnesses.
This instruction has not gone unheeded. In the years since
Daubert, trial court judges have demonstrated new zeal for
their gatekeeping responsibility." At least in reported deci-
sions, judges have traded in their "let it in for what it is worth"
attitude for a healthy dose of skepticism that leads to a legiti-
mate review of the reliability of expert opinions and an in-
creased willingness to exclude faulty expert testimony." One
early tally reported that almost two-thirds of reported post-
Daubert decisions excluded expert testimony.' Although re-
ported decisions are perhaps more likely to exclude testimony
such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.").
41. Id. at 592-93.
42. Id. at 597.
43. Id. at 595 (quoting renowned evidence expert Judge Weinstein) ([The judge
in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present
rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.-).
44. See Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr. & Brett A. North, Joiner v. General Electric:
The Next Chapter in the Supreme Court's Handling of Expert Testimony, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Sept. 1997, at 9.
45. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 388 ("It seems apparent that Daubert presages
the beginning of the end of the "let-it-in-for-what-it's-worth' philosophy of expert testi-
mony-likely to be replaced by the 'careful and meticulous' review advocated by the
Tenth Circuit and already practiced by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.").
46. See id. at 387. According to this report, many decisions excluding expert testi-
mony after Daubert "address testimony which would likely have been admitted in the
past." Id.
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than unreported "run-of-the-mill" decisions allowing this tes-
timony,47 the reported cases nonetheless document a signifi-
cant change in judicial attitudes about expert testimony.
Given the changes following Daubert, several aspects of the
judicial decision-making process regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony deserve mention. First, it is the party offering
expert testimony who carries the burden of establishing the
reliability of that testimony.4 Second, judges should not shirk
their responsibility to carefully scrutinize proffered expert testi-
mony.49 Third, this review should often take place in a prelim-
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490,
1497 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ('IThe plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that their expert testimony meets the Daubert standards of scientific reliabil-
ity."); Dennis v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 161 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Under
Rule 104(a), it is the proponent of the evidence that must demonstrate the reliability
of the evidence."); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497,
1506 (D. Kan. 1995) ("Under Daubert, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating by
a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Hoyt is proposing to testify to (1) economic
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue."); TRW Title Ins. Co. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 887 F. Supp. 1029, 1030
(N.D. L 1995) ("The proponent of the proffered expert testimony . .. bears the bur-
den of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence."); Schmaltz
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (N.D. M1. 1995) ("JThe proponent of
the proffered expert testimony ... bears the burden of establishing its admissibility
by a preponderance of proof.").
49. The Seventh Circuit noted that the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence
regarding expert witness testimony requires increased judicial screening of proffered
expert testimony.
mhe consequence of this liberality is not, or at least should not be, a
free-for-al. The elimination of formal barriers to expert testimony has
merely shifted to the trial judge the responsibility for keeping 'junk sci-
ence" out of the courtroom. It is a responsibility to be taken seriously. If
the judge is not persuaded that a so called expert has genuine knowledge
that can be genuinely helpful to the jury, he should not let him testify.
Wilson v. Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
In its consideration of the Daubert expert testimony on remand from the Su-
preme Court, the Ninth Circuit noted that the gatekeeping task facing federal courts,
though substantial, could not be avoided:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Courts opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed
scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where
there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not "good sci-
ence," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was not
"derived by the scientific method." Mindful of our position in the hierar-
chy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with this
heady task.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) [Daubert Il].
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inary proceeding outside the trial itself.' Fourth, the judge's
gatekeeping responsibility should extend to all aspects of expert
testimony, so that any deficiency should result in exclusion of
the testimony.51 Finally, trial court decisions regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony should be accorded deferential
review by appellate courts, since trial courts are better able to
evaluate the reliability of expert testimony.52 Given these as-
50. See generally Lyons, supra note 4; cf Daubert 11, 43 F.3d at 1318-19 n.10
("Where the opposing party ... raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of
expert scientific evidence, the district court must hold an in limine hearing (a so-
called Daubert hearing) to consider the conflicting evidence and make findings about
the soundness and reliability of the methodology employed by the scientific experts.").
51. See Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry. Co., 920 F. Supp. 732, 737
(E.D. Ky. 1996) ("[The 'gatekeeping' function is applicable to all aspects of expert
testimony, including the qualifications of the witness."); David L. Faigman, Mapping
the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 555 (1995) (discussing the
scope of the judge's gatekeeping responsibility).
52. Following Daubert, a substantial majority of the circuit courts adopted defer-
ential review of district court decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny. See, eg., Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476 (lst Cir.
1997); Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 91 F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996); Lust v.
Merrell Dow Pharn., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597-98 (9th Cir. 1995); Cavallo v. Star Enter.,
100 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (4th Cir. 1996); Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290,
292 (7th Cir. 1996); Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995); Pestel v.
Vermeer Mfg. Co., 64 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1995); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61
F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995); Government of the V.I. v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341
(3d Cir. 1995); American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 137
(6th Cir. 1995); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
Deferential review was not unanimous among the circuit courts, however. The
Third Circuit held that it gave a "hard look" to decisions excluding expert testimony
under "more stringent review." In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749-50
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 1253 (1995). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
indicated that it "appl[ied] a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial
judge's exclusion of expert testimony." Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529
(l1th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1243 (1997).
The Supreme Court recently resolved this conflict among the circuits in its re-
view and reversal of the Eleventh Circuit's Joiner decision. The Court held that
"abuse of discretion" is the proper standard of appellate review for district court evi-
dentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). The Court emphasized that the standard of review
must not vary with the effect of the district court's decision:
A court of appeals applying "abuse of discretion7 review to such rulings
may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimo-
ny and rulings which disallow it .... We likewise reject respondent's
arguments that because the granting of summary judgment in this case
was "outcome determinative," it should have been subjected to a more
searching standard of review. On a motion for summary judgment, dis-
puted issues of fact are resolved against the moving party-here, peti-
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pects of the judicial gatekeeping role, a party who believes that
opposing expert testimony is faulty now has reason to pursue a
motion in limine or objection to that testimony, with at least
some hope of success.
III. THE FRAMEWORK: TWENTY QUESTIONS FOR THE
EVALUATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Both the judges exercising their new found muscles regarding
expert witnesses and the attorneys who urge them to use those
muscles to exclude certain experts would benefit from a frame-
work for analyzing the excludibility of expert testimony. Al-
though the decision about whether to exclude expert testimony,
like many other evidentiary decisions facing judges, is some-
what fact-specific,m careful review of decisions excluding expert
testimony' 4 does reveal patterns that can constitute such a
framework
tioners. But the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such
an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard.
Id. at 514-15.
53. See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476 (lst Cir.
1997).
54. A review of reported decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony
undoubtedly would reveal many decisions admitting this testimony. See, eg., Hopkins
v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994); Glnser v. Thompson Med. Co.,
32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994); Celia v. United States, 998 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1993),
overrded by Mars v. United States, 25 F.3d 1383 (1994); Waldorf v. Shuta, 916 F.
Supp. 423, 429-31 (D.N.J. 1996); Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481, 1496 (E.D.
Wash. 1994); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 379-381 (discussing several cases admitting
expert testimony).
This article, however, focuses on judicial decisions excluding expert testimony.
The goal of this article is to set out a series of questions that should alert judges
and trial attorneys to potential problems with expert testimony and cause judges to
at least consider the possibility of excluding that testimony. This article does not take
on the daunting task of reviewing reported cases to define the fine lines between
exclusion and admission of expert testimony under each of the potential bases for
excluding expert testimony. For example, the article notes that discovery and disclo-
sure problems may justify exclusion of expert testimony (see infra Part IILR), but
does not pretend to outline a demarcation between acceptable discovery and disclosure
problems and those that are substantial enough to require exclusion of the expert.
Drawing these lines would require more space than a single law review article can
occupy. Given the fact-specific nature of evidence decisions and conflicts among deci-
sions of various judges, drawing these lines may indeed be impossible.
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This section outlines a somewhat expansive' set of ques-
tions that a judge must answer when considering whether to
exclude proffered expert testimony.' Whenever any of these
questions is answered "no," the judge should give serious con-
sideration to keeping the expert off the stand or limiting her
testimony."7 If each question is answered either "yes" or "not
applicable," the expert testimony is admissible, absent a limita-
tion from a legal doctrine outside the scope of this article.
A. Does the Jury Need Expert Testimony?
The first, often overlooked, question is whether expert testi-
mony will help the jurors. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
expert testimony is admissible only when "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 58 If
the jurors can understand the evidence and decide facts on
their own, expert testimony should not be allowed. The more
55. Anyone who tries to outline significant inquiries covering as broad a range as
expert testimony would be foolish to claim that the resulting list is comprehensive.
The number of reported decisions concerning expert witness testimony is staggering.
A check of West Group's Key Cite system reveals that courts have already cited
Daubert over 1,000 times, less than five years after the Supreme Court wrote it. This
author does not claim that every expert witness decision has been reviewed for this
article. While the list of questions in this article is designed to cover the major
themes regarding the potential exclusion of expert testimony, it is certainly not com-
prehensive.
Despite the admitted lack of complete comprehensiveness of the list of ques-
tions, the questions do overlap considerably. For example, compare Part ILD with
Part ILF and Part IH.G with Part IH.H. Any attempt to be at least somewhat thor-
ough in an area with as many published opinions as evidence law is almost certainly
doomed to be both moderately incomplete and somewhat redundant.
56. For the convenience of attorneys and judges, these questions are repeated in
the Appendix.
57. The Third Circuit has noted that any flaw in an expert's analysis renders the
expert's conclusions suspect.
[Any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors
renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step
completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that meth-
odology.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490,
1496 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ("Each step of the experts methodology must be scientifically
valid.").
58. FED. R. EvD. 702.
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basic an issue, the less likely that an expert actually would be
helpful.5 9
Despite this fundamental requirement for expert testimony,
parties often attempt to use experts merely to bolster or pack-
age the other evidence that they have introduced, without add-
ing any actual expertise."o Courts should and do rebuff these
attempts to gild the lily.
In this regard, judges have excluded the proffered testimony
of: human factors experts who would have offered opinions
about how human beings interact with their environment and
how accidents occurred; 1 a "memory expert" who would have
59. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 outline the test as follows:
Whether the situation is a proper one for expert testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier [of fact]. "There is no more
certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common
sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to deter-
mine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue
without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of
the subject involved in the dispute." Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5
VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952).
FED. RL EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
In outlining the Rule 702 test, the Seventh Circuit cited another leading com-
mentator on evidence issues, Judge Weinstein, who himself quotes still another lead-
ing evidence commentator, Professor Wigmore:
The crucial question is, 'On this subject can a jury from this person re-
ceive appreciable help.'" 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIn'S EVIDENCE 702[1], at 702-7 to 702-8 (1990) (quoting John
Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1923, at 21 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis sup-
plied by Wigmore). An expert's opinion is helpful only to the extent the
expert draws on some special skill, knowledge, or experience to formulate
that opinion; the opinion must be an expert opinion (that is, an opinion
informed by the witness' expertise) rather than simply an opinion
broached by a purported expert.
United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
60. See, e.g., Benson, 941 F.2d at 603 ("Cantzler's purpose was to summarize the
government's trial evidence and give his expert opinion as to why that evidence
showed that Benson was required to file income tax returns in 1980 and 1981.");
United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1233-34 (2d Cir. 1991) ("In fact, as became
all too apparent in the government's summations, the purpose of the [expert] testimo-
ny was actually to corroborate Johnson's testimony and provide a foundation for what
we conclude to be an inappropriate guilt by alleged association argument.").
61. Courts have perhaps issued more Rule 702 exclusion orders for human factors
experts, who have a tendency to "state the obvious," Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990), than for any other group.
One court rejected the testimony of a human factors expert who would have
testified that water would freeze at thirty-two degrees and presented an opinion re-
garding how a slip and fall occurred. See Stepney v. Dildy, 128 F.R.D. 77, 80 (D. Md.
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testified that, over time, people forget things;-, a criminal de-
1989).
In a similar case, another judge also rejected human factors testimony:
[Tihe court found that the testimony of plaintiffs expert witness Keith
Vidal would not assist the jury's understanding of the evidence or deter-
mination of the fact issues. Mr. Vidal, a forensic engineer, proposed to
testify to the co-efficient of friction, the effect of temperature on moisture,
proper mat placement, and human reaction to particular signage, as
these various facts related to the degree of safety of the wet floor on the
day in question. The court found that the normal life experiences and
qualifications of the jury would permit it to draw its own conclusions
concerning the safety of the floor, based upon the lay testimony of eye-
witnesses.
Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (D. Kan. 1993), affd, 66
F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1995).
In another case involving a slip and fall, the Second Circuit reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff because the district court improperly admitted similar ex-
pert testimony:
Starting with his comments about the condition of the railroad
platform from which Andres fell, Shanok was permitted to testify repeat-
edly about matters that were neither scientific nor in any way beyond
the jury's ken.... Andres testified that the station was dirty, filthy and
kind of icy, that the platform had trash and ice on it and that the light-
ing was very dim. The jury needed no special training or expertise to
decide whether the platform thus was a "safe place"; yet, over the objec-
tion of defense counsel, Shanok was permitted to testify that it was not.
Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989).
In yet another case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of a district court
that first allowed the testimony of the plaintiffs human factors expert, then reversed
itself after trial and granted the defendants motion for new trial. Persinger, 920 F.2d
at 1186. The Fourth Circuit explained:
When stripped of its technical gloss, however, Dr. Kroemer's testi-
mony did no more than state the obvious. He testified that he applies an
industry safety formula to determine the weight that Persinger could
safely lift. The formula, however, was based on several basic variables
including the distance of the lift, and the distance from the body at
which the weight was held. The typical juror knows that it is more diffi-
cult to lift objects from a seated position, especially when the lift is away
from the body rather than close to the body. In fact, even Dr. Kroemer
admitted the industry formula represented a "commonly expressed7 prin-
ciple. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district judge abused his dis-
cretion in finding that the evidence should not have been admitted, espe-
cially given his previously expressed doubts.
Id. at 1188.
62. See United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985). The Tenth
Circuit explained that the proposed testimony was within the jury's ordinary knowl-
edge:
Affieck also argues that the trial court erroneously prohibited a
"memory expert' from testifying. Here, the expert purportedly would have
explained how well or how poorly people are able to remember events
over the course of time and why they remember things the way that
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fense attorney who would have testified that criminal defen-
dants who stand to garner reduced sentences under the federal
Sentencing Guidelines' "substantial assistance" provisions have
an incentive to incriminate other criminal defendants; gender
and race discrimination "experts" who would have testified
about whether a plaintiff was mistreated; accountants who
would have made certain inferences from the evidence and
performed simple arithmetic; a psychologist who would have
discussed problems with witness identifications;, and an "un-
they do. Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, an expert may be allowed to testify if
an untrained layman would not be able to make an intelligent evaluation
of the evidence without such expert testimony. Specialized testimony
explaining memory, however, is improper. The average person is able to
understand that people forget; thus, a faulty memory is a matter for
cross-examination. The trial court properly refused to admit the testimony
of appellant's expert witness.
Id at 1458.
63. See United States v. French, 12 F.3d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming ex-
clusion of expert because expert testimony is only "appropriate when it relates to
issues that are beyond the ken of people of ordinary intelligence").
64. See Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D. Colo.
1992).
65. See TRW Title Ins. Co. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 887 F. Supp. 1029,
1032 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ('Mr. Perks' 'expert' opinion will be excluded because it does not
rely on any expertise but is comprised of inferences from the record that he is no
more qualified than the jury to draw."); see also United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d
598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991) ('Much of [Internal Revenue Agent] Cantzler's testimony
consists of nothing more than drawing inferences that he was no more qualified than
the jury to draw."); De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 449
(W.D. Mich. 1996) ('It is of limited assistance to a jury for a CPA to do simple math-
ematical calculations which a reasonable juror or lawyer could perform."); Israel Trav-
el Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours Inc., No. 92C 2379, 1993 WL 387346,
at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1993) (rejecting the testimony of a proposed expert be-
cause a junior high student could have done the expert's averaging).
66. See United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Cir-
cuit outlined the proposed expert testimony.
At trial, defendants offered the testimony of Dr. Patricia Devine, a
psychologist, to show: (1) the effect of stress upon identification; (2) the
difficulty of cross-racial identification; (3) an overview of the memory
process; and (4) the impact of a short viewing period upon the accuracy
of an identification.
Id. at 1023. The circuit court affirmed the district courts exclusion of this testimony
We need not revisit the question whether this type of testimony is
sufficiently reliable in general to go to the jury. It properly is excludable
in any event under Rule 702 because it will not assist the trier of fact.
Such expert testimony will not aid the jury because it addresses an issue
of which the jury already generally is aware, and it will not contribute to
their understanding of the particular dispute.
Id. at 1024.
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safe ballast conditions" expert who would have testified that
smaller rocks are better than larger rocks for those building
railroad tracks. 7
In some cases, courts excluding expert testimony have con-
cluded that the expert would not add to the local knowledge
possessed by jurors. In a New York drug trafficking case, a
court concluded that the jury did not need the testimony of a
police officer who would have testified about common street
deals.' In a Maine moose-automobile accident case, the court
rejected the testimony of a witness who discussed the "foresee-
ability that cars and animals will collide with ensuing inju-
ries.'
The Seventh Circuit again reached the same result in affrming a district
court's refusal of a criminal defendant's request for the appointment of "an expert
witness to testify about the undependability of eyewitness identification under stress-
ful circumstances. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 984, 971 (7th Cir. 1992) ("These
hazards are well within the ken of most lay jurors, and Larkin's counsel was granted
ample opportunity at trial to discuss those hazards and cast doubt upon the
witnesses' eyewitness identification of his client.").
67. See Taylor v. Illinois Cent. RB. Co., 8 F.3d 584, 585 (7th Cir. 1993). The
Seventh Circuit noted:
Taylor contends that Dipprey would have testified that smaller caliber
yard ballast would have provided safer footing than the larger mainline
ballast, and that smaller caliber ballast had been used in other rail sys-
tems. This issue, already before the jury in several instances, boils down
to whether a pile of large rocks is harder to stand on than a pile of
smaller rocks. Notwithstanding Dipprey's lengthy experience in the rail-
way industry, any lay juror could understand this issue without the as-
sistance of expert testimony. Therefore it was proper for the district court
to exclude Dipprey's testimony.
I& at 585-86.
68. See United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1991). In CastiUo, the
Second Circuit reversed a criminal conviction due to the admission of the police
officer's testimony-
Simply stated, we are not convinced that New York jurors in
today's climate, flush with daily news of the latest drug bust, need an
expert to enlighten them as to such elementary issues as the function of
a scale or index card in a drug deal.... We are equally confident that
the purpose of forcing customers to snort cocaine-to flush out undercover
police officers-was the most obvious, and indeed, perhaps only real ex-
planation for the practice and certainly well within the reach of any
juror's common sense.
Id. at 1233.
69. Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Me. 1993). The
court also rejected the experts testimony about whether the product at issue met the
promises made in the manufacturer's advertising.
Mhe jury is able to read or hear for itself any advertising that I find is
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B. Is the Witness Qualified To Serve as an Expert?
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, all that one needs to
serve as an expert witness is "knowledge, skill, experience;
training, or education. 70 It is significant that this list is joined
by the disjunctive "or," not the conjunctive "and." Therefore, a
witness who wishes to present expert testimony only needs to
show that she possesses one of these five items.
Given this generous list of ways for witnesses to qualify as
experts, it seems improbable that anyone whom a party would
bother to offer as an expert witness would not qualify to serve
in that capacity.71 Nonetheless, courts have with somewhat
surprising frequency found that proffered experts do not possess
the qualifications necessary to present "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge."72
A review of these cases reveals the creativity of would-be
expert witnesses, the zealousness of the parties who would call
them to the stand, and the willingness of judges to thwart
those who would stretch the concept of "knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education"7" too far. Courts have refused to
allow the testimony of: a heroin addict who wanted to explain
heroin withdrawal;74 a pathologist who studied torture in his
admissible and to determine whether the defendants' conduct lives up to
that advertising. I find no way in which testimony by Mr. Kelley on this
subject would be helpful
Id. at 186.
70. FED. 1. EVID. 702.
71. In an article discussing the potential bases for exclusion of expert testimony,
it is perhaps important to note that these bases do not include the lack of a .license
to practice the profession that the witness is practicing when she testifies. Courts
have held that the lack of a state-mandated license is not a barrier to expert testi-
mony. See, e.g., Plywood Property Assocs. v. National Flood Ins. Program, 928 F.
Supp. 500, 508 (D.N.J. 1996) (discussing experts in structural engineering, architec-
ture, and building design) ("Prior qualification as an expert witness, specialized de-
grees, licenses or publications in their field, while all commendable, are not required
to be possessed by every witness acting as an expert"); Dickerson v. Cushman, Incm,
909 F. Supp. 1467, 1472 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (product design) ("In general, the fact that
an expert does not have a degree or license in his or her professed specialty goes to
the weight of his or her testimony rather than its admissibility.").
72. FED. R. EVID. 702.
73. Id.
74. See Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995).
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spare time and wished to testify about the physiology of tor-
ture; 7 an ecologist who would have testified about chromosom-
al damage from exposure to hazardous substances; 6 an experi-
enced horsewoman who offered to testify about the "behavioral
propensities of horses that are blind in one eye";77 a mechani-
cal engineer who attempted to testify about electrical engi-
neering issues;7' a psychologist who offered opinions regarding
medicine and toxicology;79 railroad trainmen who desired to
testify about the design of railroad engine cabs;" a
pulmonologist who wished to testify about allergies;81 a master
mechanic who wished to use his experience as a full-time "con-
sultant in forensic automotive mechanics" to justify testifying
about alleged automotive design defects;' engineers who had
limited or no experience with the products at issue, but were
nonetheless ready to testify about the design of those prod-
ucts;s' a psychologist who offered criticisms of product de-
75. See Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1993).
76. See Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. Ansick v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Ind. 1996). This
case establishes that even rather extensive experience is not enough to qualify one as
an expert, if that experience is not in the precise field about which the expert wishes
to opine:
In an effort to establish her expert qualifications, Draper states that she
has 25 years experience riding horses, 15 years experience boarding hors-
es, 10 years experience training horses, and 5 years experience riding
horses competitively-, and then states in a conclusory fashion, "I am an
expert regarding the care and training of American Quarter Horses". [sic]
(Draper Aff., U 2-6). Draper does not state what, if any, experience she
has had with horses that are partially blind, or what, if any, training,
education, or other form of credentials she has with regard to horse
training.
Id. at 780.
78. See Trumps v. Toastmaster, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 247, 251-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
79. See Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D. Okla.
1995).
80. See Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry. Co., 920 F. Supp. 732, 737
(E.D. Ky. 1996).
81. See Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 373 (D.N.J. 1995)
([Trhe Court finds Dr. Auerbach unqualified to testify because he totally lacks experi-
ence in treating or diagnosing patients with platinum salt allergy and has at beat a
limited familiarity with the small amount of literature in the field which deals with
the still contested issue of whether platinum salt allergy can cause long term health
problems even after the patient is no longer exposed to chloroplatinate salts.").
82. Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that the would-be expert "conceded that he had never professionally designed
a component part for an automobile, although he had done so 'in the courtroom.).
83. See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Wil-
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sign;8 an impressively credentialed epidemiologist and occupa-
tional health specialist who proposed to testify about health
physics issues that he apparently could not comprehend;' a
witness who might have been qualified to estimate the quantity
of minerals on property, but wished to testify about the value
of the minerals on a given piece of property;' a certified pub-
lic accountant who had not "dealt with a construction enterprise
comparable in size, magnitude, and number of projects" for ten
years;87 and a landlord who was ready to testify about real
estate appraisal issues.'
In other cases, courts have allowed witnesses to serve as
experts in specific fields, but disallowed testimony outside those
specific fields of expertise. Courts have refused to allow: a rec-
reational safety expert to present opinions regarding
snowmaking at a ski resort;-' a bank loan expert to testify
liams lacks education in mechanical engineering, and his experience in machine de-
sign is limited to a project he conducted in one of his engineering classes in which
he designed the base of a chair. He has never designed a conveyor, although he
claimed to have designed 'nuts and bolts and that kind of thing one at a time.");
Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 919 F. Supp. 1353, 1356-58 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(tire engineer who had no experience with steel bolted radial tires not allowed to tes-
tify that a steel bolted radial tire was defective), affld, 114 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997);
Linn v. Laidig, Inc., No. MJG-94-3252 (D. Md. 1996), discussed in Industrial Machin-
ery: Testimony Excluded, 24 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 379, 379 (BNA) (Apr. 12,
1996) (a mechanical engineer with no experience involving similar machines was not
allowed to testify about the design of a silo unloader); Delaney v. Merchants River
Transp., 829 F. Supp. 186, 189-90 (W.D. La. 1993) (an alleged design expert who had
limited experience in designing barges was not allowed to testify that the lack of a
permanent ladder was a design defect), affd, 16 F.3d 1214 (5th Cir. 1994).
84. See Jaurequi v. John Deere Co., 971 F. Supp. 416, 425 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
85. See Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 17 (D. Mass. 1995) ("As
was made painfully clear in his deposition testimony, Dr. Shalat has difficulty with
even elementary concepts of health physics.").
86. See McLendon v. Georgia Kaolin Co., 841 F. Supp. 415, 419-20 (N.D. Ga.
1994).
87. Richmond Steel Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir.
1992); cf. Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1993) ("As the district court
pointed out, Katsaris was last qualified as an accident reconstructionist in 1965.
Since that time, Katsaris had not taken any refresher courses.").
88. See Zlotlow v. United States, 35 Fed. CL 133, 138 (1996).
89. See Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995) ("When
Dr. Caskey was sworn in, the court carefully reviewed his qualifications as an expert.
It canvassed his educational background, skills, association memberships, publications,
and prior work experience. Ultimately, the trial court limited Dr. Caskey to testimony
about recreational safety policies, which bore the most direct relationship to his edu-
cation and background in recreation. He was not allowed to discuss snowmaking.").
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1
about taxation and painting industry issues; a pharmacolo-
gist to testify about causation in a products liability case
against a drug manufacturer;91 an expert in the cause and ori-gin of fires to testify about automobile design; a meteorolo-
gist to testify about dose estimates;9' and both physicians9
and engineers95 to present theories about how injuries were
caused.
The reported cases rejecting proffered expert testimony reveal
several other interesting principles. First, given the frequency
with which professional expert witnesses open their testimony
by proudly proclaiming that they have presented expert testi-
90. See United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth
Circuit outlined the deficiencies in the witness's credentials:
The District Court concluded that the witness was an expert on
bank loans. There was no showing, however, that the witness was an ex-
pert in taxation or in the painting business ....
Finally, there was no showing that the witness had sufficient ex-
pertise to convert the loan application statistics to reflect accurately
Marabelles' proper tax deductions or proper tax liability in a manner
that would reasonably assist the jury.
Id. at 1381.
91. See Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1477 (D.V.L
1994) ("While Dr. Palmer's background as a pharmacologist may qualify him to offer
opinions as to the properties or mechanism of action of a drug, it does not qualify
him to offer ultimate opinions as to causation in this action."), aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d
Cir. 1994).
92. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 882 F. Supp. 770, 772-73 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
93. See In re TMI IAtig. Cases Cosol. II, 911 F. Supp. 775, 797-98 (M.D. Pa.
1996).
94. See Watkins v. Schriver, 52 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Watkins fails to
adequately explain how Dr. Knox's expertise as a neurologist enables him to testify
that the injury was more consistent with being thrown into a wall than with a stum-
ble into the corner."); cf Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 548-49
(S.D. Ga. 1986) ("In short, Dr. Cowen was a plastic surgeon with relatively little, if
any, scientific knowledge regarding Bendectin, its components or its effects.... The
Court properly excluded Dr. Cowen's opinion regarding the causation issue.").
The fact that a physician treated a plaintiff does not relieve the physician of
the responsibility of establishing that she is qualified to discuss causation of the
plaintiff's medical condition. See OYConner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d
1090, 1105 n.14 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do not distinguish the treating physician from
other experts when the treating physician is offering expert testimony regarding cau-
sation.).
95. See Hoover v. Bell Sports, Inc., No. 92-87212-CIV-Moreno (M.D. Fla. 1995),
discussed in Judge Finds Engineer Unqualified To Testify on Medical Causation Issue
and Dismisses Suit, 23 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1008, 1008 (BNA) (Sept 22,
1995).
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mony in other courtrooms, it is significant to note that experi-
ence as an expert witness does not, standing alone, qualify a
witness to serve as an expert in a later case.'e In fact, some
courts are especially willing to exclude the testimony of "hired
gun" experts who frequently appear in litigation.9" The courts
also seem to apply something of a sliding scale in evaluating
expert testimony, with increased scrutiny for would-be experts
who possess only minimal qualifications.98
In the final analysis, courts must carefully evaluate the qual-
ifications regarding those who would serve as expert witnesses,
despite Rule 702's liberality regarding qualifications. In the
words of the Seventh Circuit, "[Tlhe consequence of... liberali-
ty is not, or at least should not be, a free-for-all." 99 Indeed, the
96. See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir.
1997) (rejecting opinion of witness who testified as an expert 126 times); Hardin v.
Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119,
124 (5th Cir. 1993); Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc., 878 F.2d 791, 800 (4th
Cir. 1989) (noting that "it would be absurd to conclude that one can become an ex-
pert simply by accumulating experience in testifying").
Conversely, lack of prior experience as an expert witness does not render one
ineligible to testify as an expert. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 937 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("Although [the expert] had never before been qualified as an expert wit-
ness, even the most qualified expert must have his first day in court.").
97. See, eg., In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1500
& n.5 (D. Ham 1995) (disparaging a witness as "an expert for hire" and noting that
"he has devoted his career to partisan adjudicatory purposes"); Lipsett v. University
of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R 1990); supra note 9.
98. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 289 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994)
(agreeing with district court's exclusion of a government safety expert's testimony
where the expert "cautioned that his training did not involve engineering or physics
and that the government would hire a specialist in that area if that expertise was
needed"); Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter MR. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1989)
(vacating the District Court's judgment due to improper admission of expert testimo-
ny) ('We find the admission of Shanok's authoritative pronouncement that the defen-
dants were negligent particularly troublesome because his qualifications as an expert
in this area were questionable at best."); Trumps v. Toastmaster, Inc., 969 F. Supp.
247, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("I am satisfied that Kaufmann's lack of qualifications in
electrical engineering, and the inadequacies of his methodology (a factor which proba-
bly flows from the first), viewed separately or in combination, constrain me to hold
that... Kaufmann cannot testify to the proffered opinions at trial."); Diaz v. John-
son Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 373 (D.NJ. 1995) ("Dr. Auerbach's lack of quali-
fications... is also relevant to the reliability analysis and is a factor tending to
discredit reliability."); Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) ("In addition, Dr. Bertman is not a geneticist.").
99. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1288 (7th Cir. 1993).
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liberality of Rule 702 may require judges to exercise increased
caution when evaluating the credentials of expert witnesses.1"
C. Is the Expert's Testimony Based upon Valid Science (or
Other Technical or Specialized Knowledge)?
The Daubert°1 case did more than simply instruct trial
court judges that they must carefully scrutinize proposed expert
testimony. It also outlined some, though admittedly not all,"
of the analysis that judges should use in their scrutiny of this
testimony.
Under Daubert, the critical question is whether the expert's
opinion is based upon valid science." The Court outlined the
trial court judge's "flexible"1 4 analysis of proposed expert tes-
timony:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then,
the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue."°5
100. The Seventh Circuit is among the courts that believe Rule 702's liberality
requires judges to review carefully the qualifications of proposed experts. With regard
to qualifications, the court in Wilson stated:
The elimination of formal barriers to expert testimony has merely shifted
to the trial judge the responsibility for keeping "junk science" out of the
courtroom. It is a responsibility to be taken seriously. If the judge is not
persuaded that a so called expert has genuine knowledge that can be
genuinely helpful to the jury, he should not let him testify.
Id. at 1238-39.
101. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
102. According to the Daubert Court, "[miany factors will bear on the inquiry"
about whether proposed expert testimony is admissible, and "we do not presume to
set out a definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593.
103. See id. at 594-95 (The "overarching subject (of the trial courts inquiry into
proposed expert testimony) is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary rele-
vance and reliability--of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.").
104. Id, at 594.
105. Id. at 592-93.
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Although some have expressed doubt about whether trial court
judges are capable of evaluating the validity of scientific analy-
sis,l'c the Court indicated that it was "confident" that they
were up to this task.107
Although Daubert malkes specific reference to science, its
reasoning is not applicable only to scientific expert testimony.
Because the proposed expert testimony in Daubert involved
science, the decision states that the appropriate inquiry is
whether an opinion is based upon valid science." Trial courts
should engage in a similar analysis whenever expert testimony
is offered."o In other words, all expert testimony must be
106. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The
Far-Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the
Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1995).
107. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
108. See id. at 592-93.
109. See, eg., Rincon v. United States, 510 U.S. 801 (1993) (vacating case below
and remanding for a determination of the admissibility of expert testimony on the
issue of the reliability of eyewitness identification, in light of Daubert), appeal after
remand, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50
(6th Cir. 1994) (outlining the distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert
testimony, then holding that the Daubert requirement of underlying validity applied
to both categories); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497,
1506 (D. Kan. 1995); cf United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 999 ("Thus, on its own
terms, Daubert applies not only to testimony about scientific concepts but also to
testimony about the actual applications of those concepts."). For a lengthy list of
cases applying Daubert to a variety of scientific and non-scientific expert testimony,
see Sorensen by Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 647 n.15 (8th Cir. 1994).
In a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit explained why the Daubert analysis
should be applied to non-scientific expert testimony:
[W]hile Daubert dealt with expert scientific evidence, the decision's focus
on a standard of evidentiary reliability and the requirement that pro-
posed expert testimony must be appropriately validated are criteria
equally applicable to "technical, or other specialized knowledge. ... "
Moreover, the nonexclusive list of factors relevant under Daubert to as-
sessing scientific methodology-testing, peer review, and "general accep-
tance--are also relevant to assessing other types of expert evidence.
Whether the expert would opine on economic valuation, advertising psy-
chology, or engineering, application of the Daubert factors is germane to
evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person whose opinion
in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among
his professional peers.
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Although the Daubert case involved expert testimony based upon "novel" sci-
ence, the Court indicated that its underlying validity test was not to be used only in
such cases. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11 (explaining "we do not read the re-
quirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence");
see also Watkins, 121 F.3d at 991 ("Daubert expressly denies that the precepts of
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based upon valid technical or other specialized knowledge.110
The courts have therefore held, for example, that: accounting
evidence must be based upon valid accounting principles;1
economic testimony must be based upon valid economic princi-
ples;" engineering evidence must be based upon valid engi-
neering principles;'13 and testimony about crime schemes must
be based upon valid criminological principles."4
To guide trial courts in their analysis of whether expert opin-
ions are based upon valid science or other technical or special-
ized knowledge, the Court outlined a non-definitive" list of
factors for courts to consider."6 These factors, plus another
factor added by the Ninth Circuit in its reconsideration of
Daubert upon remand from the Supreme Court, provide several
questions for courts to answer when determining whether ex-
pert testimony is based upon valid science or other technical or
specialized knowledge. The remainder of this subpart will dis-
cuss these questions.
Rule 702 apply only to unconventional evidence.").
110. Although many courts have held that the Daubert test of technical validity
applies to non-scientific evidence, this view is not universal. See McKendafl v. Crown
Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d
1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996). But cf Bogosian v. Mercedes-
Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 479 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[E]ven if Daubert'a specific
discussion of the admissibility of scientific principles did not strictly apply to
Davidson's testimony, the admissibility of the testimony was still controlled by the
requirement of factual relevance and foundational reliability.")
111. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir.
1993); De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 448-49 (W.D. Mich.
1996).
112. See, eg., Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567-70 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (future earning capacity); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware
Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1236-41 (3d Cir. 1993); Aluminum Phosphide, 893 F. Supp. at
1506-07.
113. See Peitzmeier v. Hennesy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) ("As
a threshold matter, the Peitzmeiers argue that Daubert is inapplicable to Milner's tes-
timony, contending that his opinions are founded on basic engineering principles,
whereas-Daubert applies only to novel scientific testimony. This argument fails, for
our Court has not given Daubert so narrow a reading. [Citations omitted.] We con-
clude that the Daubert analysis is properly applied to Milner's proffered [engineering]
testimony."), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997).
114. See United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496-97 (8th Cir. 1994) (drug
trafficking and gang activity); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 937 (2d Cir.
1993).
115. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
116. See id. at 593-94.
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1. Has the Expert's Theory or Technique Been Tested?
The first factor mentioned by the Daubert Court is whether
the underlying theory that the expert bases her theory upon
"can be (and has been) tested."117 Several courts have
identified testing validating the expert's opinion as the most
important factor in the analysis of expert testimony and have
rejected proposed expert testimony that was based upon untest-
ed theories or techniques.1 As one court noted, "the history
of engineering and science is filled with finely conceived ideas
that are unworkable in practice."1" Other courts have based
their rejection of proffered expert testimony in part upon the
absence of testing of the underlying theory or technique.' °
117. Id at 593. One court has stated this question as, 'Is the Methodology Based
Upon a Testable Hypothesis?" In re TMI Litig. Cases ConsoL 11, 911 F. Supp. 775,
793 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
118. See, eg., Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1994); Zarecki v. Na-
tional R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. I. 1996) ('Of these four
factors [listed in Daubert], the first-whether the proffered theory has been test-
ed-has been deemed the most important."); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 878
F. Supp. 1119, 1121-22 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F.
Supp. 5, 567 (N.D. L 1993) (rejecting expert testimony regarding alleged design
defect in part because "the evidence here is that [the expertTs design will not work").
119. Stanczyk, 836 F. Supp. at 567.
120. See, e.g., Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344 (7th
Cir. 1995) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony where 'the record supports the
district court's conclusion that the witness did not conduct any studies or analysis to
substantiate his opinion"); Wheat v. Pfizer, Inc., 31 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1994)
('Key to this [Daubert] test is whether the experts hypotheses can be and has been
tested."); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 881 (W.D. Tex.
1997); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1525 (E.D.
Ark. 1996); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996); City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1527 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (exclud-
ing expert opinions that "have not and cannot be tested").
In affirming the exclusion of expert testimony about alternative braking system
design, the Seventh Circuit outlined the testing issue:
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that hands-on testing is an abso-
lute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony. Rule 702 is de-
signed to ensure that, when expert witnesses testify in court, they adhere
to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their
professional work. [Citations omitted.] This objective can be accomplished
in a number of different ways, including through the review of experi-
mental, statistical, or other scientific data generated by others in the
field. Indeed, in Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc, 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.
1993), we acknowledged that "there may be a situation in which personal
experiments or observations meet the requirements of Daubert." I& at
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2. Has the Expert's Theory or Technique Been Subjected to
Peer Review and Publication?
The Daubert decision's second listed "pertinent consideration"
for evaluating expert opinions is whether the underlying theory
or technique has been published in peer reviewed journals for
the applicable profession."2 The Court noted that, although
publication in a peer reviewed journal was not absolutely nec-
essary,'22 subjection of a theory or technique to scrutiny by
other professionals was useful because such scrutiny provides
an opportunity for identification of substantive flaws in the
theory or technique.'
Several lower courts have excluded expert testimony that was
based upon theories or techniques that had not been subjected
to peer review and published.' Other decisions demonstrate
614 n.6. As in Porter, however, the opinions offered by Dr. Carpenter in
this case clearly lend themselves to testing and substantiation by the
scientific method. The district court clearly acted well within its discre-
tion in concluding that the absence of such testing indicated that the
witness' proffered opinions could not fairly be characterized as scientific
knowledge.
Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996).
Another court held that the important question is not whether the theory could
be tested, but whether it actually had been tested: "In this case, the ultimate conclu-
sion that latex paint causes asthma and its various component hypotheses certainly
could be tested. However, it is conceded that these hypotheses have not been sub-
jected to this kind of scientific scrutiny." Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936
F. Supp. 900, 905 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
121. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
122. See id at 594 ("The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed
journal ... will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the
scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is
premised.").
123. See id. at 593. For an in-depth analysis of peer review, see Effie J. Chan,
Note, The "Brave New World" of DauberL True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review,
and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100 (1995).
124. See, e.g., Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996);
Wheat v. Pfizer, 31 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1994); Cuevas v. E.L DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Kelley v. American
Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 881 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Haggerty v. Upjohn
Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp.
209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996) ([T]he opinions expressed by Dr. Blais ... have not been
subjected to ... peer review."); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcross Chems., Inc., 877 F.
Supp. 1504, 1526 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp.
565, 567 (N.D. MI1. 1993); cf Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 925 F. Supp. 1323, 1329
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that courts should not take experts at their word when they
claim that peer reviewed publications support their opinions,
because allegedly supportive publications do not always actually
support the expert's conclusions.'
(N.D..Il. 1996) ("Hales has not provided adequate scientific support for [his] damning
conclusions. He cites no published journals, studies, reports, or treatises, nor has he
set forth the methodology employed in reaching his conclusions. He does not identify
testing or research techniques. There is no reference to peer review of any results
reached by Hales."), affd, 117 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997).
In a decision which predated Daubert, the Fifth Circuit noted the value of the
peer review process in weeding out insufficiently supported theories:
[Miany experts are members of the academic community who supplement
their teaching salaries with consulting work. We know from our judicial
experience that many such able persons present studies and express
opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article submit-
ted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts subject to
peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with many
others, that ought to be considered in deciding whether to accept expert
testimony.
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986);
see also Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) ("We reject
the suggestion that cross-examination at trial and the number of Milner's appearances
in design-defect cases can take the place of scientific peer review."), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Dennis v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.N.J.
1996) (noting with disdain an expert's "decision to restrict the use of the report to
the judicial forum rather than subject his opinion to peer review").
125. See O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1106 (7th Cir.
1994) ("Dr. Cheribel cites several sources that allegedly support this methodology.
However, none of these sources indicates that radiation-induced cataracts can be iden-
tified by mere observation."); Cartwright v. Home Depot U.SA, Inc., 936 F. Supp.
900, 904 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("The published literature relied on by Dr. McKay and
indirectly by Dr. Brooks provide little, if any, support for the opinions expressed.");
Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.N.J. 1996) (The case law
also warns against use of medical literature to draw conclusions not drawn in the lit-
erature itself ... Reliance upon medical literature for conclusions not drawn therein
is not an accepted scientific methodology."), affid, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997);
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 762 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("[T]he plaintiff's expert
could not cite any documented cases where exposure to these chemicals caused the
alleged illness. Rather, he relied on studies where high doses of atrazine caused eye
irritation in rabbits."), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150
(4th Cir. 1996); cf National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp.
1490, 1517 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ("Plaintiffs claim Dr. Sherman's articles were peer re-
viewed. But her potential bias because of her direct involvement in litigation in the
four cases on which she reported was not disclosed in her articles. Nor did she dis-
close the opinion of experts attributing the birth defects to genetic causes. And the
opinions she expressed in the articles do not go to the same extent as the opinions
she would put before the jury. So the court discounts the value of any peer review
that might have occurred with respect to those articles."); id. at 1525 ("Although Dr.
Sherman has published reports about four cases involved in litigation, she has not
published her protocols, reasoning or methodology for peer review.").
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3. Is the Known or Potential Rate of Error for the ExperL's
Technique Minimal?
Next, the Daubert decision somewhat cryptically states, "in
the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily
should consider the known or potential rate of error... and
the existence of standards controlling the technique's opera-
tion." ' This "rate of error" 7 factor may be the least under-
stood and least applied of the factors outlined in Daubert,'
perhaps because a party challenging opposing expert testimony
often claims that the underlying theory or technique is overly
subjective and, therefore, does not have any quantifiable rate of
error.m
126. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
127. For a discussion of the effect of an expert's ignoring of standards, see infra
Part III.E.
128. For examples of courts applying the rate of error test, see In re TAM Litig.
Cases Consol. I, 911 F. Supp. 775, 795 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ('The court finds the poten-
tial rate of error to be high.") and Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp.
1441, 1480 (D.V.I. 1994) ("[The theory of plaintiffs expert witnesses that they can
directly extrapolate from experimental animal studies without supportive positive
human studies to opine as to causation in humans is one that has an extraordinarily
high rate of error, [citation omitted], and this fact weighs against the admissibility of
opinions based upon those methodologies."), aft'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
For a discussion of the Daubert rate of error factor, see FOSTER & HUBER,
supra note 4, at 69-109.
129. See Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 298 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Because
Milner has not conducted any experiments or testing of any kind, there cannot be a
known rate of error for his results. Likewise, no evidence is offered concerning a
'potential' rate of error."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Frank v. New York,
972 F. Supp. 130, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("the lack of an objective testing method for
MCS [multiple chemical sensitivity] gives rise to high probability of error in MCS
diagnoses"); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (CAs
for the 'third Daubert factor, Dr. Mash's causation methodology has no known or
acceptable rate of error because her hypothesis is untested."); Cartwright v. Home
Depot U.S.A, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 905 (MD. Fla. 1996) ("The third Daubert factor,
known or potential error rate, is inapplicable here because Plaintiffs' theories are
vague and untested. Thus no rate of error in identification of victims can be ascer-
tained."); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcross Chem., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504, 1526 (N.D.
Ala. 1995) (excluding expert testimony based upon the expert's "subjective beliefs" in
part because such opinions "cannot have a known or potential rate of error").
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4. Is the Expert's Theory or Technique Generally Accepted
Within the Relevant Professional Community?
The final factor outlined in the Supreme Court's Daubert
opinion is whether the theory or technique underlying the
expert's opinion is generally accepted as reliable by the relevant
professional community." ° The listing of this factor by the Su-
preme Court is particularly significant, because the Daubert
case overruled a lengthy series of federal cases stating that the
Frye v. United States"5 "general acceptance" test was the sole
factor in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.' 2
After rejecting Frye's general acceptance test as the sole means
for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, however,
the Daubert Court noted that "general acceptance' can yet have
a bearing on the inquiry." " s
Old habits do indeed die hard. General acceptance remains
an important consideration. Several lower federal courts have
determined that proposed expert testimony was not based upon
generally accepted theories or techniques, then excluded the
testimony.'
130. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
131. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). The Frye test provided:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.
Id. at 1014.
132. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 585-89.
133. Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
134. See, e.g., Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 881
(W.D. Tex. 1997) (rejecting an expert's testimony because "his theory regarding gener-
al causation is not generally accepted in the medical community); Haggerty v.
Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("[Tjhere is no general accep-
tance or support for Dr. Mash's causation methodology in the scientific community.");
Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996); Stalnaker v. General
Motors Corp., 934 F. Supp. 179, 181 (D. Md. 1996) ("[T]he Court agrees with the
defendant that the plaintiff's expert witnesses do not present sufficient evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a defect in the product, and
that the so-called 'skip-lock theory is indeed a theory that is 'scientific,' in the sense
that it relies on basic principles of physics and mechanics. Yet, it is in itself obvious-
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5. Did the Expert's Theory Exist Before Litigation Began?
Following the Supreme Court's remand of the Daubert case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,'
the Ninth Circuit added a factor to the Supreme Court's list of
items to be analyzed by courts engaging in the "flexible" inqui-
ry."M According to the Ninth Circuit, "[o]ne very significant
fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to
testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or
whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the
purposes of testifying."' Based in part upon its finding that
ly so far afield from any recognized scientific principle to be completely inadmissible
under the current standard for admissibility of expert testimony, as established in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)."), affd, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall
Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1477 (D.V.I. 1994) ("[E]ach of plaintiffs expert witness-
es used a methodology not recognized by the relevant scientific community, and not
subject to scientific verification. Therefore, each of their opinions was not helpful and
must be excluded."), afftd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994); Dennis v. Pertec Computer
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.N.J. 1996) (rejecting an experts opinion because it
"has simply not gained general acceptance"); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 911 F.
Supp. 775, 798-99 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Kurncz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386,
388 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("Mr. Smith's method has been subject to peer review and he
is well published. The peer review, however, has not led to general acceptance--the
fourth [Daubert] factor."); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 773 (E.D. Va.
1995) ("In sum, neither Dr. Monroe nor Dr. Belanti sufficiently adhered to the estab-
lished toxicology methodology in forming their conclusions . . . ."), affd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996); Chikovsky v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D. Fla. 1993); City of Tuscaloosa, 877 F.
Supp. at 1526; cf Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, Nos. 92-1015-MLB & 92-1016-MILB,
1994 WL 26922 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 1994) (rejecting a defendant's request for a dental
examination of the plaintiff to review the relationship between enamel defects and
cerebral palsy, because studies did not indicate any relationship between the two
conditions); FoSTER & HUBEP., supra note 4, at 226 ("When all is said and done, a
great number of judges applying the new terms will end up making calls very similar
to those they would have made under Frye.").
It is important to note that at least one court has recognized that "an expert
cannot establish that a fact is generally accepted merely by saying so." Grimes v.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33, 38 (D.N.H. 1995).
135. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597-98.
136. Id. at 594. Although the Supreme Court's Daubert decision listed only four
factors, the Court explicitly stated that its opinion was not a "definitive," all-inclusive
checklist. Id. at 593.
137. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
[Daubert Ill.
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the expert testimony at issue was developed solely for litigation,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the testimony.s
Following the lead of the Daubert II decision, other reported
decisions indicate that courts have rejected proposed expert
testimony that was based upon theories developed solely for
litigation." Given the frequency with which experts are re-
tained to analyze issues for litigation, judicial distaste for theo-
ries developed solely for litigation is significant.1'
138. See id. at 1317 ("While plaintiffs' scientists are all experts in their respective
fields, none claims to have studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects
before being hired to testify in this or related cases").
139. See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996);
Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Dr. Schwartz had never
tested human or animal tissues for the presence of asbestos fibers (or, so far as ap-
pears, for anything else) before being hired by the plaintiffs lawyer."), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 480 (1996); Estate of Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.
Kan. 1997) ("We ... find it significant that all of plaintiffs experts developed their
opinions expressly for the purpose of testifying. None of the witnesses has done any
research on his theories outside the context of this suit."); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997) ("Dr. Parent was specifi-
cally employed by plaintiffs to state an opinion concerning Oust.... None of his
opinions are an outflow of natural research done prior to being employed by the
plaintiffs."); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[I1t ap-
pears that Cordis is correct that Dr. Brautbar has developed his opinions expressly
for purposes of testifying in this case and that he has not himself performed any
tests nor can he rely on other published tests or data regarding brain shunts to sub-
stantiate his theories. Under the circumstances and in accord with Daubert, the Court
concludes that his expert testimony should be excluded."); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlo-
rine Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 670-71 & n.3 (D. Nev. 1996) (referring to Daubert
H in excluding expert testimony despite the fact that "one of the physicians who
examined the plaintiffs in this case published the results of his examination of the
plaintiffs" in an obscure medical journal); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. H, 911 F.
Supp. 775, 798 (B.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing expert to testify about generally accepted
techniques, but not about "methodology ... derived solely in connection with this
litigation"); Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(excluding expert testimony where the expert "did not formulate his opinion on
whether halothane can cause plaintiffs disease before working on this litigation");
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1479 (D.V.I. 1994) ("In eval-
uating the scientific validity or reliability of a particular methodology, it is also ap-
propriate for a trial court to consider whether the methodology is used in a non-judi-
cial setting. If a methodology has not been put to any non-judicial use, that weighs
against admissibility ... There is no evidence that any of the methodologies em-
ployed by plaintiffs expert witnesses has been put to any use outside of the court-
rom."), affid, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994); cf Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
No. 82-CV-710-H (N.D. Okla. filed May 28, 1996), discussed in Summary Judgment
Granted to Manufacturer; Plaintiffs' Proof Inadmissible Under Daubert, 24 PROD.
SAY & LIAB. REP. 571, 571 (noting that the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma followed the Ninth Circuies Daubert H decision).
140. The Ninth Circuit's Daubert H opinion outlines one court's distaste for theo-
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D. Does the Expert's Theory or Technique Fit" the Facts of the
Case?
A scientifically or technically valid theory or technique, while
necessary, is not sufficient. Expert testimony is permissible only
when a valid theory or technique can legitimately be applied to
the facts at issue in the litigation. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court referred to this relevance issue as a consideration of
"fit.141
As the Daubert Court observed, '[flit' is not always obvious,
and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientif-
ic validity for other, unrelated purposes."' 2 Judging from the
experience of federal courts applying Daubert's fit test, the
Court was right. Numerous federal courts have excluded pro-
posed expert testimony because the theory or technique under-
lying the testimony did not adequately fit the facts at issue.
Examples of non-fitting expert testimony include: a hedonic
ties developed solely for litigation:
Bendectin litigation has been pending in the courts for over a de-
cade, yet the only review the plaintiffs' experts' work has received has
been by judges and juries, and the only place their theories and studies
have been published is in the pages of federal and state reporters. None
of the plaintiffs' experts has published his work on Bendectin in a scien-
tific journal or solicited formal review by his colleagues. Despite the
many years the controversy has been brewing, no one in the scientific
community-except defendant's experts-has deemed these studies worthy
of verification, refutation or even comment. It's as if there were a tacit
understanding within the scientific community that what's going on here
is not science at all, but litigation.
43 F.3d at 1318. To support this holding, the Ninth Circuit cited Eleventh Circuit
Judge Frank Johnson's observation that "the examination of a scientific study by a
cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others trained in the field of
science or medicine." Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985),
quoted in Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1318 n.&
141. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
142. Id. The Court also provided an example of its afit" test-
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid
scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if
darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact
However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), evidence that
the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in
determining whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved
irrationally on that night
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damages expert's testimony based upon studies that had no
relevance to the plaintiffs loss of enjoyment of life; ' a safety
expert's simulation that did not match the facts of the acci-
dent;1" an environmental expert's conclusions regarding the
probable sources of hazardous wastes that had no factual basis
in how the defendant actually conducted its operations;1 "3 an
expert's proposed use of an unrelated movie and model to theo-
rize about dispersion of the plume after the Three Mile Island
nuclear accident;1' and several medical experts' opinions re-
garding causation of medical conditions, where the underlying
experiments or data did not adequately establish the causal
link. ' Even before Daubert, some courts rejected expert testi-
143. See Sullivan v. United States Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Kan.1994).
144. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 289-90 (3d Cir. 1994).
145. See Textron, Inc. v. Barber-Colman Co., 903 F. Supp. 1546, 1554 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (1Koon asserts that given certain waste-producing operations at the plant, met-
al-working and cooling water discharge, it is reasonable to infer that heavy metals
would be present in Burlington's wastewater tank 'probably all of the time. But Koon
has no factual basis concerning how metal-working operations performed at the
Burlington plant contributed heavy metals to the wastewater stream. His opinion re-
flects this absence of foundation); see also id. at 1556 ("IThe perigee of Koons 'ex-
pert opinion' is his assertion that BTEX probably entered Burlington's wastewater
system because Burlington's employees probably dumped Varsol down sinks and toi-
lets at the plant.*), id. at 1557 ("[The Court finds that studies relied upon by Koon,
and therefore his opinion in this matter, are not sufficiently tied to the facts of this
case.*).
146. See In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. I1, 911 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa. 1996). The
court explained its rejection of the expert testimony as a matter of inadequately es-
tablished fit:
The plume movie does not "fit' within the case because it is based upon
an undefined source term, fails to account for weather readings on the
TMI weather tower, and fails to incorporate all primary data. Thus, it
cannot be found to bear a valid relationship to the TMI accident. Simi-
larly, the water model does not take into account the actual topography
of the TMI area. Any demonstration performed using the water model,
therefore, would not bear a close relationship to the way a substance
would be dispersed into the atmosphere around TML
Id. at 798.
147. See, eg., Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g. Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.
1996) (rejecting expert testimony based upon rat studies, because rat results were not
even predictive of mouse results, let alone human results); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-
Zero Prod., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Ms. Deimer's witness, Dr. Rubl,
had the responsibility to apply his analysis to the facts of this case-a case involving
mobile medical equipment. Because of his lack of experience, this responsibility was
not fulfilled. [Citation omitted]. Consequently, there was no 'fif with Dr. RuhF's tes-
timony, and the district court properly precluded the testimony under the second-step
of the Daubert inquiry.'); Daubert I, 43 F.3d at 1322 ('[W]hat plaintiffs must prove
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mony when it was based upon experiments or data that were
not sufficiently related to the facts at issue.'
is not that Bendectin causes some birth defects, but that it caused their birth defects.
To show this, plaintiffs' experts would have had to testify either that Bendectin actu-
ally caused plaintiffs' injuries (which they could not say) or that Bendectin more than
doubled the likelihood of limb reduction birth defects (which they did not say)."); Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1527 (E.D. Ark.
1996) ('The Court agrees with the defendants that the methodologies of Dr. Sherman
and Dr. Bidanset do not ft' the plaintiffs' case."); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1414 (D. Or. 1996) ("[In the absence of proof of general causa-
tion, Dr. Bennett's testimony regarding his differential diagnosis does not 'fit' LeaAnn
Hall's case because there will be no evidence that silicone gel breast implants are a
legitimate possible cause of Ms. Hall's disease."); Grimes v. Hoffnann-LaRoche, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 33, 38 (D.N.H. 1995) ('[Elven if it were generally accepted that some
photosensitive chemicals will produce cataracts if they become photobound to lens
protein, that general proposition would not fit the facts of this case unless one could
reliably draw an analogy between those photosensitive chemicals and Accutane....
Finally, even if it could reliably be claimed that all photosensitive chemicals that
become photobound to lens protein will produce cataracts if they are present in cer-
tain concentrations, that proposition would be irrelevant here unless there were some
basis in the record to conclude that Grimes had taken a sufficient dose of Accutane
to produce cataracts. Dr. Lerman has not attempted to determine the amount of
Accutane that he claims reached Grimes' lenses."); cf. Cavello v. Star Enter., 892 F.
Supp. 756, 762-63 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting expert testimony about exposure to toxic
substances) ("[flt is apparent that a determination regarding the scientific validity of
a particular theory requires not only an examination of the trustworthiness of the
tested principles on which the expert opinion rests, but also an analysis of the reli-
ability of an expert's application of the tested principals [sic] to the particular set of
facts at issue."), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th
Cir. 1996).
For a review of several cases involving expert testimony about causation of
alleged medical conditions, see National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F.
Supp. 1490, 1501-07 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
148. In 1987, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary
judgment for a chemical company defendant in a suit for recovery of damages alleg-
edly caused by a toxic herbicide. Although the Fifth Circuit did not use the word
"fit," this concept was critical to its holding-
Dr. Johnson relied on a study of the effect of picloram on rats that
showed that when exposed to large amounts of the chemical, the rats
developed cancerous tumors and died. He admitted that the effects of
chemicals differ between humans and rats. Here, of course, there was no
evidence Viterbo had been exposed to comparable amounts, nor that his
symptoms were similar in any respect We then are left to conclude that
the study, at most, is only evidence that picloram may produce some un-
identified effect on humans. Such evidence is clearly not sufficient to
provide a source of support for an opinion that Tordon 10K caused
Viterbo's depression, nervousness, hypertension, renal failure and other
ailments.
Viterbe v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987).
In a products liability case arising out of a collision between a vehicle and a
moose, the United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed expert tenti-
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E. Did the Expert Properly Apply Applicable Standards?
If an expert is testifying about a subject matter that is cov-
ered by industry or professional standards, a court may exclude
testimony that does not apply these standards.149 For exam-
ple, courts have rejected: a design engineer's testimony about
an alleged design defect, when the product met applicable stan-
dards;160 a forensic engineer's testimony that ignored the
"widely accepted doctrine" of railroad law that a locomotive
engineer can assume that a pedestrian will heed a proper
alarm;'' an economist's selection of a benchmark period that
was inconsistent with sound economic principles;52 and an
mony based upon a simulated moose crash, but excluded testimony based upon a
static test The courts explanation of its exclusion of the static test reveals concerns
about fit-
In apparent response to the plaintiffs' expert Dr. Newman's suggestion
that two measures would have strengthened the Subaru XT roof header,
specifically front and rear welding and a greater thickness of steel
(60/1000 gauge rolled steel, boxed cell), Dr. Perl undertook to perform a
static test evaluating this proposal. He did not use an actual header
from a Subaru or any other car. Instead, he selected a piece of metal of
the same gauge as is used in the Subaru XT header and a piece of met-
al of the gauge approved by Dr. Newman and established his own appa-
ratus. The apparatus does not reflect the actual shape of the Subaru
header.
Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 817 F. Supp. 191, 191-92 (D. Me. 1993).
149. Decisions rejecting expert testimony that ignores applicable standards are a
complement to, but somewhat different than, the Daubert opinion's suggestion that
courts "ordinarily should consider.., the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling [a] technique's operation." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The Daubert Court
seemed to be suggesting that the absence of applicable standards should weigh
against the admission of expert testimony. The decisions discussed in this subpart re-
ject testimony where applicable standards exist, but the experts did not apply these
standards. These decisions may be more directly related to the Daubert opinion's
discussion of general acceptance than its discussion of standards.
150. See Alveromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 419 (4th Cir. 1993) ("We
affirm the district courts decision, holding that a directed verdict in a products liabil-
ity case is appropriate where an expert witness fails to prove that advisory industry
standards have been violated or that those standards fall below an acceptable level.");
qf Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D. MII. 1993) ("[To the
extent there are controlling design standards, they offer no support to Clark's opin-
ion.").
151. See Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2d Cir.
1989).
152. See In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (D.
Kan. 1995); see also United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 FILD.
675, 683 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that "Hoyt violated a fundamental principle of eco-
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accountant's estimates of market value that were not based
upon sound valuation methodology."
F. Are the Expert's Assumptions Reasonable?
In many instances, experts must make factual assumptions to
reach their ultimate conclusions. When an expert makes unwar-
ranted assumptions that favor the party that retained her, she
runs the risk of having her testimony excluded. Courts have
rejected the proffered testimony of: an epidemiologist and occu-
pational health specialist who made "unproven assumptions"
about a plaintiffs exposure to radiation;"M a forensic engineer
who "assumed facts that were not in evidence" considering the
condition of a railroad platform; a physician who made as-
sumptions based upon the plaintiff's version of disputed facts in
a case involving the adequacy of medical care provided to an
inmate;166 and several economists who made unjustified as-
sumptions that favored the parties that hired them."'
nomics").
153. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993).
154. See Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 19 (D. Mass. 1995) (ex-
cluding the expert's testimony where "his explication of the basis of [his] opinion is so
riddled with factual inaccuracies and unproven assumptions that no reasonable jury
could give his opinion credence"); see also Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F.
Supp. 511, 519 (N.D. nM. 1996) (excluding testimony about exposure to hazardous
waste where "[t]he experts have also relied on untrustworthy data in reaching their
conclusions .... The newspaper accounts of the Savannah River data, relied on by
all three experts, are inaccurate, as recognized by both the subsequent retractions by
the newspaper and the admissions of the experts themselves.").
155. See Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter RR, 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989).
156. The Sixth Circuit outlined the reason for exclusion of the doctor's testimony:
The trial court excluded the testimony because it was based on assump-
tions not in evidence, but rather assumptions based on plaintiffs version
of events. The trial judge correctly stated that it was the jury's province
to determine disputed facts, such as whether the officers made the re-
quired inspection every half hour and whether the decedent screamed
and banged the doors for hours. It was the jury's prerogative to decide
those issues based upon the credibility of the testimony.
Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547 (6th Cir. 1989); see also National
Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1524 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ("Dr.
Miers does not know the level of exposure or dose of Mrs. Smits or Ashley even
though she is convinced that it was significant.").
157. See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Where lost future earnings are at issue, an experts testimony should be excluded as
speculative if it is based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the plaintiffs future
employment prospects."); Joy v. Bell Helicopter, Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 569 (D.C.
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G. Has the Expert Avoided Mere Speculation?
In a matter akin to unreasonable assumptions, courts have
also prohibited expert testimony that was merely speculation.
The "mere speculation" cases, however, extend beyond concerns
about baseless factual assumptions. In many of these cases, an
admittedly qualified expert has simply reviewed available infor-
mation, or some portion of this information, and reached a
conclusion that favors her client. The expert's speculation often
encompasses not only disputed facts, but analysis of these facts.
Examples of rejected testimony include: a human factors
expert's conclusion that the defendant probably caused an air-
plane accident by inadvertently retracting the airplane's landing
gear;" several medical experts' hypotheses about exposure to
dangerous substances and the conditions that may have result-
ed from this exposure;59 an engineer's claim of misalignment
Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhere is little, if any, basis in the record for Dr. Glennie's estimates of
Mr. Joy's future earning capacity. Most prominently, the assumption that Mr. Joy
would move into consulting and wholesaling appears to be wholly speculative. Indeed,
Dr. Glennie simply made up new lines of work for Mr. Joy."); In re Air Crash Disas-
ter at New Orleans, La., 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Wle find an assumed
8% annual salary increase continuing over almost 40 years to be unsupported by the
record and completely incredible."); Henry v. Hess Oil V.L Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 247
(D.V.L 1995) ("Dr. Copemann's Report assumed that because of his injuries, plaintiff
could no longer work as a turnaround foreman and would have to pursue another
vocation; but there was no reason to assume, as Dr. Copemann did, that this alterna-
tive vocation need be with another employer.").
158. See Jeteraft Corp. v. Flight Safety Int'l, 16 F.3d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1993)
(af irming and adopting the district court's rejection of the proffered expert testimony
and stating, "But, seems to me, to come in after the fact as in this case and to take
into account contrary denials and, in the absence of any evidence from the plaintiff
as to what he did, to opine that the event was the inadvertent retraction by Kimball
is just professional speculation.").
159. See Wright v. Willamette Indus., 91 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996) (revers-
ing judgment for plaintiffs because their expert's "testimony regarding the probable
cause of the Wrights' claimed injuries was simply speculation); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Dr. Fozzard's deposition, while expressing
what may be an insightful, even an inspired, hunch concerning the cause of the heart
attack that Rosen experienced in June of 1992, lacks scientific rigor... ITihe court-
room is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort."), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 73 (1996); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th
Cir. 1994) (affirming district court decision excluding testimony tying plaintiffs' medi-
cal conditions to exposure to chemicals at work where "the toxicology sections of the
affidavits, which summarize the scientific literature discussing evidence that particular
chemicals can cause particular injuries (and which thus are a necessary foundation
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of gears that was reached without a comparison of the align-
ment to design specifications;"c a prefabricated building
expert's theory that a building installer "may have no knowl-
edge regarding the oily substance on the metal roofing
panels"; 6' an ergonomist's tying of keystroking to the devel-
opment of upper extremity disease that was based upon "unre-
corded mental methodology";'62 an odorization expert's theories
about odorizing a gas used to sterilize medical equipment that
were based upon experimentation that "appears to show some
promise for the future, [but] at this point in time remains fu-
turistic and speculative"; and two psychiatrists' hypotheses
for any conclusions the experts might draw), fail to discuss the majority of the medi-
cal conditions alleged by plaintiffs. Consequently, the court correctly determined that
there is no evidence that the experts' conclusions about the cause of these conditions
are based on anything more than subjective belief and unsupported speculation.);
Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130, 136-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he theory underly-
ing MCS [multiple chemical sensitivity] is untested, speculative, and far from general
acceptance in the medical or toxicological community."); Treadwell v. Dow-United
Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974, 982 (M.D. Ala 1997) ("In the instant action, the court
adopts the reasoning and conclusions of the [other] courts, which found that 'the
"science" of MCS's etiology has not progressed from the plausible, that is, the hypo-
thetical, to knowledge capable of assisting a fact-finder, jury or judge."); Haggerty v.
Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("Dr. Mash's causation testimo-
ny is based upon speculation.); Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F. Supp.
511, 522 (N.D. IM. 1996) (holding that a doctor's "guess that Muzzey was exposed
prenatally is pure speculation"); Trail v. Civil Eng'r Corps, 849 F. Supp. 766, 768
(W.D. Wash. 1994); see also Williams v. Mead Corp., No. 94 C 5823 (N.D. Ill. filed
June 6, 1997), discussed in Judgment Granted on "Daubert" Grounds in Death from
Hypersensitivity Pneumonitis, 25 PROD. SAFETI & LIAB. REP. 606 (BNA) (June 27,
1997) (excluding testimony linking cashew nut oil in friction paper to plaintiff's condi-
tion as "completely speculative"); cf Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp.
779, 786 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Dr. Pantiz's conclusions derive from her unquantifiable per-
sonal experience and instinct, not from scientific theory and reasoning. This is not
the type of expert scientific reasoning that the Court may submit to a jury."), affd,
118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997).
160. See Stalnaker v. General Motors Corp., 934 F. Supp. 179, 180 (D. Md. 1996),
affd, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997).
161. Collier v. Varco-Pruden Bldgs., 911 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D.S.C. 1995) (citation
omitted) ("The court finds this statement to be too speculative to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the oil on the panels was a patent danger.").
162. Dennis v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F. Supp. 156, 161 (D.N.J. 1996) (ex-
cluding the testimony as "nothing more than unsupported speculation"); cf. Zarecki v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (excluding
the testimony of an expert who tied plaintiffs work environment to her carpal tunnel
syndrome because "Dr. Farrells conclusions can only be characterized as his own
subjective beliefs as to the cause of Zarecki's carpal tunnel syndrome").
163. Mediger v. Liquid Air Corp., 926 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Or. 1995).
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regarding a plaintiffs mental health fourteen years prior to
their treatment of the plaintiff.M
In some opinions, courts discuss not the "mere speculation"
test, but whether experts have established that their opinions
are reliable to a "reasonable degree of professional certain-
ty." 16 Physicians, in particular, seem to be held to the re-
quirement of establishing that their opinions are reliable, in
words familiar to any personal injury attorney, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty."
H. Did the Expert Adequately Investigate the Facts?
Some experts make not just factual assumptions, but factual
mistakes. An expert who reaches an opinion without sufficiently
investigating the facts runs the risk of having a court exclude
164. See Goomar v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 319, 326 (S.D. Cal.
1994), affd, 76 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1996).
165. In re TMI Litig. ConsoL Proceedings, 927 F. Supp. 834, 867-68 (M.D. Pa.
1996) ("While the law does not require Lochbaum to state his expert opinion with
unwavering certainty, it does require him to state his expert opinion with a reason-
able degree of professional certainty.").
166. See, eg., Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Indeed,
no witness for the plaintiff could say with scientific or medical certainty that the
particular vaccine at issue here caused Novak's disorder."); Rutigliano v. Valley Bus.
Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 791 (D.N.J. 1996) (excluding physician's causation testimony
where she was unable to exclude other possible explanations), affd, 118 F.3d 1577
(3d Cir. 1997); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 892 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. 11. 1995) ("Dr.
Fozzard admitted in his deposition that he cannot state within a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that use of a nicotine patch caused the plaintiffs heart attack."),
affd, 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 73 (1996); cf. Allen v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) ("While appellants' ex-
perts acknowledge the lack of statistically significant epidemiological evidence, they
rely on certain studies as 'suggestive' of a link between EtO exposure and brain can-
cer. 'Suggestiveness' is not by the experts' own admission statistical significance, nor
did the appellants' experts show why and how mere 'suggestiveness' scientifically
supports a causal connection; this basis for their scientific opinion must be rejected.");
National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1523 (E.D. Ark.
1996) ("[Plaintiffs have no qualified expert to offer an opinion to a jury which would
permit that jury to conclude that genetics have been ruled out as a possible cause of
Ashley's birth defects."); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441,
1469 (D.V.L 1994) ("A positive gnimal study merely suggests that there might be a
need to study the agent in humans. Done Test., Tr. 11/16/93 (Mid-Morning) at 42.
For these reasons, Dr. Done cannot reasonably rely upon Dr. Gilbert's chick studies
or rabbit study to render an admissible opinion that Primatene Mist or Tablet ingre-
dients are teratogenic in humans."), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
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her testimony if the insufficient investigation leads to factual
errors or omissions that render her conclusions unhelpful to the
jurors. The official reporters contain substantial numbers of
cases excluding expert opinions due to factual mistakes..7 or
incomplete factual investigations"s by experts. The frequency
167. See Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 19 (D. Mass. 1995) (hold-
ing that an expert's analysis was "riddled with factual inaccuracies").
168. See, eg., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Wil-
liams did not investigate designs of other conveyors available today or those available
in 1943. When directy asked about his efforts to find similar conveyors, Williams
stated. T've looked around.' His testimony about his prior experiences with conveyors
was similarly vague. Where an expert bases his opinion in part on his experience
with similar machines, we cannot fault the court for demanding a more detailed rec-
ollection of the expert's review and understanding of similar machines than was re-
ported by Williams."); Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 419 (4th Cir.
1993) ("Kalin never conducted a physical examination of an identical but undamaged
ladder to determine its safe or unsafe design."); United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d
1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the exclusion of a clinical forensic psychologist's
proposed testimony about defendant's naivete when the psychologist had examined the
defendant on only two occasions); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 423 (5th
Cir. 1987) ("Although a patient's oral history is generally considered reliable.... the
history Dr. Johnson used lacked reliability because it was incomplete in a critical
area."); United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 885 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming trial
court's exclusion of the testimony of an appraiser who had not viewed and written a
description of each antique, but remanding on other issues); Jaurequi v. John Deere
Co., 971 F. Supp. 416, 425 (E.D. Mo. 1997) ("While [the expert] attempts to state
what the precise defect in the corn head is, he has not even seen the corn head in
operation."); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[Albeent
studies or other evidence tending to support the testimony of Dr. Blais, the Court
and the jury would be left with nothing more than the opinion of Dr. Blais that the
brain shunt implanted in Cabrera is not safe. Cabrera would offer such testimony
from Dr. Blais notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Blais concedes he does not know the
chemical composition of Cabrera's brain shunt... ."); Ansick v. Hillenbrand Indus.,
933 F. Supp. 773, 781 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (excluding expert's testimony where her "affi-
davit provides nothing which might explain why this particular horse, which had
never before displayed dangerous or skittish behavior and had never reared or
bucked, acted as it did on May 29, 1993"); Bennett v. PRC Pub. Sector, Inc., 931 F.
Supp. 484, 500 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (agreeing with defendant's allegation that plaintiffs
expert's testimony "should be held inadmissible because it is based on such limited
information about each of the Plaintiffs"); Dennis v. Pertec Computer Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 156, 161 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Indeed, Dr. Thompson, according to defendants, never
inquired into the maintenance or repair of the keyboard to determine if that particu-
lar keyboard was an anomaly. In addition, defendants indicate that Dr. Thompson
never removed the cover of the keyboard to inspect the keys."); Henry v. Hess Oil
V.I. Corp., 163 PI.D. 237, 247 (D.V.L 1995) (excluding expert testimony about lost
income due to expert's failure to investigate availability of jobs, expected wages, and
retraining); Callas v. Trane CAC, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1990)
("Beaver never personally inspected the Callases' unit despite having had access to it
during the months it was in Mr. Fitch's possession."), affd, 940 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.
1991).
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of these decisions suggests that attorneys and judges should be
alert to the possibility of factual sloppiness by experts.
I. Is the Expert's Testimony Relevant?
In addition to the requirements applicable only to them,
expert witnesses are subject to most of the other requirements
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Given the power of expert
witnesses," it is perhaps not surprising that attorneys at-
tempt to use them to present evidence that violates these re-
strictions. Opposing attorneys and judges should be mindful of
this temptation and of the evidence law restrictions that apply
equally to lay and expert testimony.
The most basic restriction, of course, is relevance. Under Rule
402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, irrelevant evidence is not
admissible.Y Although relevant evidence is defined quite
broadly under the Rules,171 it is not without bounds. Attorneys
have been known to try to introduce irrelevant material
through experts, and courts have thwarted these efforts. In a
wrongful death action, the court excluded a hedonic damages
expert's testimony about the decedent's loss of enjoyment of life,
because damages were allowed only for diminishment of the
survivors' enjoyment of life.7  In an attempted extortion case,
the court excluded a psychiatrist's opinion that the crime victim
suffered from "dependent personality disorder," because the
victim's state of mind had no bearing on the defendant's
guilt.-1 In an action between title insurers, the court excluded
expert testimony about the plaintiffs alleged opportunity to
169. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
170. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
171. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." FED. R. EviD. 401.
172. See Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601, 606 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
("i[The s6le basis for recovery under the plaintiffs' hedonic theory is that there was a
relationship between the decedent and his parents. Dr. Albrecht's testimony is devoid
of any indication of the extent to which the Livingston's pleasure of life has deterio-
rated as a result of their son's death.*).
173. See United States v. Marsh, 26 F.3d 1496, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Any rela-
tionship between the proffered psychiatric evidence and Marsh's state of mind in
making his economic threats is far too attenuated to compel its admission.").
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mitigate damages, because the plaintiff did not learn about this
opportunity until after it had passed. 74 In a prosecution for
embezzling union funds, the court prohibited a union expert's
opinion that the defendants' actions were authorized by the
union's constitution and bylaws, because "[1]ack of union autho-
rization was not an essential element of the case."175 In a
products liability action against the seller of chemically altered
alfalfa tablets, the court prohibited expert testimony tying
children's mental retardation to their parents' exposure to EtO
residue because the plaintiffs "produced no evidence showing or
providing a reliable inference that the [defendant's] alfalfa tab-
lets taken by their parents contained any EtO residue."' 6
J. Does the Expert Avoid Relying upon Unproduced Hearsay?
Hearsay concerns also can be the reason for exclusion of
expert testimony. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence allow
expert opinions to be based upon inadmissible evidence of a
type relied upon by other experts in the same field,'7 the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to discover "the
data or other information considered" by the expert in forming
her opinion.'78 When experts' opinions are based upon hearsay
that has not been produced, or cannot be produced, in discov-
ery, courts have excluded them.17
174. See TRW Title Ins. Co. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 887 F. Supp. 1029,
1030-31 (N.D. IM. 1995).
175. United States v. Cantrell, 999 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1993).
176. Sorensen by Dunbar v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 1994); see
also Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 213 (D. Nev. 1996) ("Simply put,
Puszkin looked at tissue through a microscope and observed a giant cell reaction to a
foreign body which he could not identify at all, let alone as silicone. As such, Dr.
Puszkin's testimony is simply irrelevant under F.R.E. 401...
177. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
178. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(aX2XB).
179. One example involved a Missouri Department of Revenue criminal investigator
who specialized in vehicle theft and odometer fraud. See Pelster v. Ray, 987 F.2d
514, 518 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit held that the district court improperly
admitted the criminal investigator's testimony and reversed a judgment for the buyers
of a used car. The Eighth Circuit held that the investigator's opinion, which relied
heavily upon hearsay, was therefore itself hearsay.
Ley admitted in his testimony that he had obtained his information
(oral and written) from numerous out-of-court sources, including previous
owners, dealers, auctions, state agencies, a "confidential informant," and
various individuals connected with U.S. Wholesales. During most of his
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K. Does the Probative Value of the Expert's Testimony
Outweigh Its Danger of Unfair Prejudice?
As the Daubert Court noted, expert testimony is also subject
to the strictures of Rule 403.so Under this Rule, relevant evi-
dence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."'1 It is impor-
tant to note that the Daubert Court reminded trial judges that,
because expert testimony is potentially both powerful and mis-
leading, they must exercise more Rule 403 control over expert
testimony than over lay testimony." 2
testimony, it was unclear upon which of those sources of information Ley
was basing his testimony. Presumably, Ley's ultimate conclusions that
300 of 350 cars auctioned at South Central had been rolled back and
that U.S. Wholesales had been responsible for 204 of those 300 rolled-
back cars were based on all of the sources he identified.
We find that Ley's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The
out-of-court documents and declarants "stated" that a particular vehicle's
odometer registered a specific number of miles on a given date. Another
document or declarant told Ley that the same vehicle's odometer regis-
tered a smaller number of miles on a later date. From those two out-of-
court statements, Ley testified that the odometer had been rolled back in
the intervening period of time. Neither the Mortons nor the jury, howev-
er, had an opportunity to examine those out-of-court statements.
Id. at 525.
In another example, a court struck the testimony of a certified public accoun-
tant who did not supply the documentation for his audit conclusions: "To introduce
evidence on Richmond's damages, Ruiz testified about his audit of Bird's expenditures
during the interim period when Richmond had suspended its steel shipments. The
court ruled that the underlying- documents needed to be available before Ruiz could
present a summary.* Richmond Steel Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19,
21 (lst Cir. 1992); see also De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446,
449 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("[If the plaintiff intends to prove the existence of kickbacks
and other types of wrongful behavior, plaintiff must do so by using facts introduced
into evidence, as distinguished from an expert opinion based upon facts which may or
may not have been admitted into evidence.").
180. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
181. FED. R. EVID. 403.
182. The Court quoted an admonition from a well-known authority on evidence is-
sues: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the diffi-
culty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice
against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control
over experts than over lay witnesses." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B.
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
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This reminder has not gone unheeded. Several courts have
rejected proffered expert testimony because its probative value
was substantially outweighed by its risk of unfair prejudice.1"
Although the inherently case-by-case nature of probative value
versus potential for prejudice determinations makes it difficult
to draw universal conclusions from these decisions, neither
attorneys nor judges should forget the need to apply this test
when expert testimony carries the risk of unfair prejudice.
L. Does the Probative Value of the Expert's Testimony Outweigh
Its Danger of Confusing the Issues or Misleading the Jury?
The Daubert Court's reminder about the importance of Rule
403 was not limited to the Rule's probative value versus unfair
prejudice balancing. Instead, the Daubert opinion also explicitly
referenced the provisions of Rule 403 that allow the exclusion
of expert testimony when its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of '"confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury .... ."" Again, the lower federal courts have
duly noted this advice. On several occasions, these courts have
183. See, e.g., Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc., 94 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1996) ("We find
error... in allowing him to testify as to the comparison between Caterpillar bulldoz-
ers that were substantially different or marketed and sold at a considerably later
time."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1428 (1997); United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753,
757 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The court ruled under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that the
prejudicial effect of Wayne's testimony would outweigh its probative value.); Kurncz
v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 390 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (excluding hedonic
damages expert testimony because it "would be unduly prejudicial under Rule 403");
Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1063 (N.D. I1. 1995) (excluding hedonic dam-
ages expert's opinion because "the low probative value of such testimony (ill-fitting
data) is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (a false appear-
ance of tailoring to the individual case)"); of United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790,
803-04 (11th Cir. 1990) ("In refusing to admit the expert's charts as a summary pur-
suant to Fed. R Evid. 1006, the court found that certain of the headings of the
charts impermissibly reflected the expert's opinion as to the content of the recorded
testimony that had previously been presented to the jury. We hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the proffered charts on this
basis, as a summary of the tapes would necessarily entail judgments about the con-
tent of the conversations."), affd, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
Even before Daubert, Rule 403's "probative value versus the danger of unfair
prejudice" test had been applied to expert testimony. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co.,
826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that an expert opinion's "lack of reliable
support may render it more prejudicial than probative, making it inadmissible under
Fed. R. Evid. 403").
184. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
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repudiated expert opinions because they would have confused or
misled the jury."
The trial court's authority to disallow testimony that it finds
to be confusing or misleading gives it rather awesome power
over expert testimony. After all, Rule 403 only applies to rele-
vant evidence."s Therefore, when a court rejects testimony af-
ter balancing its probative value against its danger of confusing
or misleading the jury, it is by definition rejecting relevant
expert testimony that presumably has at least some probative
value.8 7
185. See, e.g., United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996) ('The
district court thought that this evidence could confuse or distract the jury."); United
States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In this case, the district court
found that Dr. Pezdekls testimony would not assist the trier of fact and that it would
likely confuse or mislead the jury.... We decline to disturb the district court's rul-
ing."); cf United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 31-33 York Street, Hart-
ford, Conn., 930 F.2d "139, 141 (2d Cir. 1991) ("he sole issue at trial was whether
appellant had knowledge of her sons' activities at 31-33 York Street. This was -a
simple question for which the jury needed no help. Before this last-minute attempt to
obscure the issue there was no serious contention that appellant could not compre-
hend what her sons were doing. The psychiatrist's testimony would only complicate,
not assist, the jury's decision."); United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 803 (11th Cir.
1990) ('[TVhe court found that the testimony could be confusing and misleading to the
jurors because it took matters out of context and, in some instances, was in the na-
tare of conclusions regarding the appropriate interpretations to make of the recorded
conversations."), afqd, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); Kurncz v. Honda N. AmL, Inc., 166 F.R.D.
386, 390 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("The methodology debate may simply confuse the is-
sues."); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1484-85 (D.V.L 1994)
([TI'he methodologies of plaintiffs expert witnesses ignore the question of therapeutic
dosage. I conclude that, in light of that fact, opinions from those witnesses that ther-
apeutic dosages of Primatene® Tablets and Mist are teratogenic would confuse, mis-
lead, and overwhelm the jury, and that Fed. R. Evid. 403 warrants the exclusion of
those opinions independent of Fed.R.Evid. 702 and 703."), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994).
Courts recognized the importance of probative value versus danger of confusion
or misleading of the jury balancing before Daubert. See Alevromagiros v. Hechinger
Co., 993 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1993) ('The jurors easily could have been mislead or
confused by the assumption that one competing product represented the relevant
industry-wide standard. Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to admit the competing product into evidence."); United States v. Nguyen, 793 F.
Supp. 497, 521 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Absent a thorough explanation of the studies, the jury
would have had to accept Penrod's conclusions as accurate. Thus there would be a
strong possibility of misleading the jury.").
186. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (-Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of... confusion of the is-
sues . . . or misleading the jury....).
187. See United States v. Ricon, 28 F.3d 921, 925 (9th. Cir. 1994).
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M. Does the Probative Value of the Expert's Testimony
Outweigh Considerations of Undue Delay, Waste of Time, or
Needless Presentation of Cumulative Evidence?
The remainder of Rule 403 allows judges to exclude relevant
evidence, including expert testimony, when its probative value
is substantially outweighed by considerations of "undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."" Like the other portions in Rule 403, these provisions
frequently have resulted in exclusion of expert opinions."
N. Does the Expert Avoid Impermissibly Testifying About Legal
Opinions?
The courts have not uniformly outlined the permissible scope
of expert opinions on legal issues."9 While some courts have
declared rather broadly that experts cannot opine about legal
188. FED. 1& EVID. 403.
189. See, e.g., Thompson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 941 (10th
Cir. 1994) (noting "it is plainly within the trial court's discretion to rule ... [expert]
testimony inadmissible because it would not even marginally 'assist the trier of fact,'
while it must be viewed as a 'needless presentation' (Fed. & Evid. 403)"); United
States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The exclusion of relevant,
but cumulative, evidence is within the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion.");
Kurncz v. Honda N. Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 390 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("Finally, Rule
403 takes into account such matters as waste of time and general confusion of the
issues, not to mention unfair prejudice. Where there is so much flux in the applicable
'science,' much time will be spent debating its merits. Where the case itself does not
turn on the issue, jurors traditionally have done without the evidence, and the Court
will be instructing the jurors that they need not accept any expert's opinion anyway,
the time will not be well spent."); cf United States v. Marsh, 26 F.3d 1496, 1503
(9th Cir. 1994) ("[The nature of the relationship between Marsh and Doe was fully
set out for the jury.... At least with respect to the crime of attempted extortion,
the district court in the exercise of its discretion properly could have concluded that
the expert evidence would not have been of assistance to the jury."); United States v.
DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1993) ("It should be remembered that the
district court did admit lay testimony ... concerning both DiDomenico's emotional
state at the time of the crime and Parsons' Svengalian personality. The jury heard
testimony that covered virtually the entire ground of Dr. Groves expert testimony.").
190. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).
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issues,z"' other courts have allowed experts to give such opin-
ions under some circumstances.' 2
The confusion about the proper scope of expert testimony
about legal issues stems in part from Rule 704, which provides
(with an exception that will be discussed in the next subpart)
that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.""g Despite this provi-
sion,"' courts have ruled that experts cannot state opinions
regarding such "legal issues " " as a manufacturer's standard
191. See Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1995) (excluding
expert testimony that "was not a fact-based opinion, but a statement of legal conclu-
sion"); Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547 (6th Cir. 1989) (excluding an
expert opinion because it "amount[ed] to a 'legal conclusion"); United Phosphorus v.
Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 675, 688 (D. KIn 1997) ('To the extent Harrison
is purporting to give legal conclusions and opinions, such testimony is inadmissible.");
AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 899 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A]lthough
an expert may give his opinion on an issue of fact that the jury will eventually de-
cide, 'he may not give testimony stating ultimate legal conclusions based on those
facts.1; Traumann v. Southland Corp., 858 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Ex-
pert testimony must embrace factual issues and may not include legal opinions or
conclusions."); Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D.
Colo. 1992) ("Although an expert can couch testimony in legal terms to aid the fact-
finder in understanding facts in evidence, he or she cannot set forth legal conclu-
sions."); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Reinsurance Co., 796 F. Supp. 275,
281 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("[E]xpert testimony on matters of law is generally not admissi-
ble. . "), affid, 961 F.2d 1578 (6th Cir. 1992).
192. See Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 758 n.1; Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.,
882 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1989).
193. FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
194. Those who are tempted to read Rule 704 too broadly should review the Advi-
sory Committee notes, which state:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so
as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be
helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evi-
dence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances
against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what
result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier
day. They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inad-
equately explored legal criteria. Thus the question, "Did T have capacity
to make a will?" would be excluded, while the question, "Did T have
sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property
and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme
of distribution?" would be allowed. McCormick § 12.
FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
195. According to one district court, "the Second Circuit has shown itself to be
especially concerned with testimony that tracks the language of particular statutes or
legal standards." AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 899 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
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of care and obligation to provide crashworthy vehicles,ca
whether law enforcement officers responding to a hostage crisis
acted with "deliberate indifference and conscious disregard" for
the plaintiffs safety,' a state's franchise laws and their ap-
plication to the facts at issue, 198 probable cause and qualified
immunity under the United States Constitution,' a
defendant's alleged discrimination against a plaintiff who was a
member of a racial minority group,' and whether a defen-
dant in a slip and fall case was negligent."'
In other cases, courts have focused on whether the proposed
expert testimony invades upon the court's duty and authority to
instruct the jury on the appropriate law to be applied by the
jury. When courts believe the expert opinion might present the
jury with an alternative to the judge's instructions about the
law, they have excluded the opinion.'
1995).
196. See Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 817 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Me. 1993).
197. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit ex-
plained its exclusion of the proffered testimony as a matter inappropriate for expert
opinions:
As an expert in the field of hostage negotiation, Dr. Greenstone
can properly offer evidence on effective methods and explain to a jury
faults in the methods employed by a police force. On the other hand, Dr.
Greenstone is not in a better position than a juror to conclude whether
Carpenter's actions demonstrated such a lack of concern for Hermosillo's
safety as to constitute deliberate indifference or conscious disregard.
Opening the door to ultimate issues did not "open the door to all opin-
ions."
Id. (citation omitted).
198. See Traumann v. Southland Corp., 858 F. Supp. 979, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
199. See Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1995).
200. See Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035, 1044 (D. Colo.
1992).
201. See Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir.
1989).
202. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 758 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Our own
cases have determined that Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704 prohibit experts
from offering opinions about legal issues that will determine the outcome of a case.
That is, they cannot testify about legal issues on which the judge will instruct the ju-
ry."); Peterson, 60 F.3d at 475 ('The legal conclusions were for the court to make. It
was an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony."); Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889
F.2d 1543, 1547 (6th Cir. 1989), 889 F.2d at 1548 (quoting an earlier case providing,
"[i]t is not for the witness to instruct the jury as to applicable principles of law, but
for the judge"); Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., 817 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Me., 1993)
(excluding expert testimony that "infringe[d] upon the role of the judge so far as the
law is concerned").
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It would be disingenuous to suggest that the cases reflect a
nationally uniform definition of the permissible parameters of
expert opinions that stray near or across the line of legal opin-
ions. Despite or perhaps because of this lack of uniformity,
attorneys and judges faced with expert testimony that wanders
in this area must consider whether the testimony is an imper-
missible legal opinion under the controlling law of the relevant
jurisdiction.
0. Does the Expert Avoid Testifying About a Criminal
Defendant's Mental State When It Constitutes an Element of the
Crime or of the Defense?
The exception to Rule 704 states:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant
did or did not have the mental state or condition constitut-
ing an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
alone.'
This provision substantially restricts ultimate issue testimony
about the defendant's mental condition.'
P. Does the Expert Avoid Attempting to Bolster the Credibility
of Other Witnesses?
The credibility of other witnesses is another forbidden zone
for expert witnesses. Because the jury is responsible for making
credibility determinations, courts do not permit expert testi-
mony that is offered to bolster the credibility of other wit-
nesses.2
5
203. FED. R. EvED. 704(b).
204. For an application of this restriction, see United States v. DiDomenico, 985
F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (2d Cir. 1993).
205. See, eg., United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991)
('Credibility is not a proper subject for expert testimony;, the jury does not need an
expert to tell it whom to believe, and the expertes 'stamp of approval' on a particular
witness' testimony may unduly influence the jury."); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d
336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining that 'putting an impressively qualified expert's
1998]
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Q. In a Products Liability Design Defect Case, Has the
Plaintiffs Design Expert Established the Existence of an
Alternative Feasible Design?
Several courts have held that experts who wish to criticize
the design of a product must present credible evidence of an
alternative feasible design for the product." A theoretical al-
ternative design is not enough. Courts have excluded testimony
criticizing product design when the testifying expert's alternate
design has not been tested.'
stamp of truthfulness on a witness' story goes too far."); De Jager Constr., Inc. v.
Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 449 (W.D. Mich 1996) ("Much of plaintiffs case will.
turn on the jury's determination as to the credibility of witnesses. Expert testimony
is not needed to determine whether a declarant or witness is telling the truth.").
206. See, e.g., Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that expert had "never designed, built, or tested a platform that has been
shown to reduce the launch effect of an exploding tire and wheel assembly while
adequately supporting the tire and wheel assembly during the tire-changing process"),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Lawrence v. General Motors Corp., 73 F.3d 587,
590 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that expert 'did not address the burdens or adverse utili-
ty effects of" his alternative design); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479-81
(10th Cir. 1993) (insufficient evidence about alternative design); Mediger v. Liquid Air
Corp., 926 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Or. 1995) ("Because there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to the availability of a safer, feasible, and practicable alternative de-
sign during the time in question, defendants' motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.").
The proposed final draft of the products liability Restatement adopts the alter-
native feasible design requirement. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY
§ 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft, 1997) ("A product... is defective in design when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the omission of the alter-
native design renders the product not reasonably safe.")
207. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997) (".The prop-
er methodology for proposing alternative designs includes more than just conceptualiz-
ing possibilities. The district court appropriately noted the lack of testing of any of
the proposed alternatives.... This is not to say that alternative product designs
must always be tested by a plaintiffs expert, but in this case, both Neathery and
Williams acknowledged the importance of testing in design."); Cummins v. Lyle
Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368-70 (7th Cir. 1996); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F.
Supp. 565, 568 (N.D. ]M. 1993).
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R. Did the Party Offering the Expert's Testimony Comply with
all Discovery and Other Pretrial Disclosure Requirements?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to make
certain disclosures, with and without discovery requests by
their opponents, regarding the identity of expert witnesses,
their opinions, and the bases of these opinions."° In addition,
both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules,
standing orders, or special orders of many federal courts require
parties to list expert witnesses and their exhibits in pretrial
statements. 2 9 A party who fails to comply with these require-
ments runs the risk of having the court exclude undisclosed
expert testimony.210
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(aX2), (bX4), (eXI). This provision of Rule 26 was added
in 1993. Several district courts have adapted rules to nullify this provision. For a
discussion of district court action concerning the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, see
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. Pamphlet No. 4, at G120.
209. See FED. R. CirV. P. 26(aX3); Rules 200-5, 235, Rules of Procedure of the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Montana; Rule 43.1, Local Rules of the
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota; see also Barrett v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1996) (outlining terms of special
discovery order).
210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(cXl) ("A party that without substantial justification
fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(eXl) shall not, unless such
failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a
motion any witness or information not so disclosed."); Barrett, 95 F.3d at 379-82 (af-
firming exclusion of expert testimony due to violation of discovery orders); Habecker
v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 289 (3d Cir. 1994) ('Wile was never listed in a
discovery response or pretrial memorandum as an expert witness, and as a result,
the district court refused to recognize Wile as an expert. The district court was cer-
tainly entitled to enforce its pretrial order, requiring the listing of witnesses in com-
pliance with discovery requests by limiting Habecker to the experts identified in the
witness list and in responses to interrogatories requesting the identity of experts and
the substance of their testimony."); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant,
Ltd., 173 F-R.D. 675, 677-78 (D. Kan. 1997) (restricting evidence to that which was
presented in Rule 26(aX2XB) report); Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34
F.3d 932, 940 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming trial court's exclusion of expert witness who
had been "inadvertent[ly]' omitted from party's pretrial witness list); United States v.
Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923, 930 (S.D. Fla. 1995) ("Plaintiff has requested that Padilla
provide further information about Mr. Jurney.... Such information should be readily
available to Padilla, and should be turned over with all due speed. Although the
Court has concluded that Mr. Jurney possesses significant qualifications, failure of
Padilla to turn over this information may force the Court to reconsider its finding.");
cf Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., 142 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Kan. 1992)
(MThe court will.., allow these listed experts to testify, subject to the limitation
that the experts for whom Employers has only provided 'deposition reports' may only
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S. Has the Expert Adequately Explained the Bases for Her
Opinion?
Many of the questions outlined above concern the legitimacy
of the bases of an expert's opinion. An expert cannot escape
scrutiny about the bases of her opinion by masking these bases.
Courts regularly exclude the testimony of expert witnesses who
cannot or do not explain the bases for their conclusions.21'
testify to matters that are within the scope of the deposition testimony.).
211. See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Per-
haps a design defect case can be mounted without calculations to support an expert's
theories, but the district court did not err in concluding that some such calculations
were necessary to demonstrate the feasibility of Williams's ideas. Although he claimed
experience in analyzing stresses and the appropriate safety factors in cable wires,
Williams did not perform any such calculations (that he thought were important
enough to retain) about the load put on the wire in this conveyor, or about the loads
the wire was capable of sustaining, or about the effect of improper maintenance, or
about the marginal safety factor of an additional wire or any of the other redundant
systems he proposed."); Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir.
1996) ("Done could have convinced the district court that his methodology was...
scientific if he had explained how he went about reaching his conclusions and had
pointed to an objective source demonstrating that his method and premises were
generally accepted by or espoused by a recognized minority of teratologists. But he
failed to do so."); Pries v. Honda Motor Co., 31 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1994) (exclud-
ing "test" of opening a seat belt latch by dropping it on a hard surface, because the
expert did not know what forces caused the buckle to open or whether these forces
were commonly present in crashes); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 924 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("The declaration of Rincon's counsel which accompanied the motion ex-
panded on each of these matters, with statements such as: 'There is a wealth of
research supporting this point. . . '; The research is clear... '; 'he research sug-
gests .... ' However, none of the research was submitted or described so that the
district court could determine if the studies were indeed scientific ... ."); Rosado v.
Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1993) (excluding expert testimony where the expert
could not establish the mathematical and physical bases for his opinion); Griffin v.
City of Clanton, 932 F. Supp. 1357, 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ("Dr. Barker does not
define the commonly accepted police standards that he cites to, and he provides no
information on the relevant policies and procedures of the City of Clanton that he
contends were violated by the officers. Additionally, Dr. Barker does not explain why
he characterizes the force used by Officer Bearden as 'Unnecessary and unreasonable,'
and he does not explain why he characterized the officers' conduct as 'careless,
'reckless,' 'unreasonable,' and exhibiting 'deliberate indifference.' He merely states
these opinions in conclusory fashion with no explanation."); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlo-
rine Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666, 671-72 (D. Nev. 1996) (excluding inadequately
explained expert testimony).
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T. Is the Expert Offering Something More than a Rgsumd and
an Opinion?
Exasperated judges have penned acerbate comments about
the inadequate analysis of well-credentialed experts. One court
rejected the testimony of an expert who "brought to court little
more than his credentials and a subjective opinion."2' 2 Anoth-
er somewhat bitterly noted, "We've been presented with only
the experts' qualifications, their conclusions and their assuranc-
es of reliability. Under Daubert, that's not enough."21 ' Still
another outlined its irritation:
Don't we have to have more than just somebody saying, I
am an industrial engineer and I have looked at this ladder,
it is the only one I have really looked at for this purpose,
but I don't like it, there ought to be something else done to
it? Doesn't there have to be more than that to make out a
case of defective design?214
Another court provided one answer to these questions, declar-
ing, "not every opinion offered by an expert is an expert
opinion."2
15
Although these statements often seem to come from frustrat-
ed courts that desire to add exclamation points to their deci-
212. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
213. Daubert H, 43 F.3d at 1319.
214. Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
the district court decision).
215. Textron Inc. v. Barber-Colman Co., 903 F. Supp. 1546, 1552 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
The court continued, "Put another way, an expert's opinion 'must be an "expert" opin-
ion (that is, an opinion informed by the witness' expertise) rather than simply an
opinion broached by a purported expert.' Id. (quoting United States v. Benson, 941
F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991)).
In a similar vein, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
held:
In this court's view, a person cannot, after suffering an accident,
simply draw up a warning limited to the dangers involved in that acci-
dent and argue that that warning should have been conveyed by the
manufacturer or seller without first also establishing that that warning is
adequate and that it actually could have been communicated in the man-
ner proposed.
Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 852 F. Supp. 933, 947 (D. Kan. 1994), affld, 70
F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 1995).
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sions excluding expert testimony, these declarations are none-
theless significant. After all, it is not uncommon for trial attor-
neys to select expert witnesses based not upon the quality of
their analyses, but upon the quality of their r6sum6s. In the
post-Daubert world of significant judicial scrutiny of expert
testimony, these attorneys run the risk of watching courts ex-
clude critical expert testimony.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once witnesses are allowed to testify as experts, they have
the run of the courtroom. Some of the most important restric-
tions that apply to other witnesses can be freely ignored by
experts. In addition, they often present testimony on the crucial
issues in dispute and thereby have tremendous potential to
sway jurors.
Before an expert is given this power, the judge should mean-
ingfully scrutinize her credentials, the scope of her proposed
testimony, the underlying bases of her opinions, and her factual
assumptions and investigation. If any of these necessary build-
ing blocks is found wanting, courts can, should, and indeed
must exclude her testimony. Anything short of this rigorous and
consequence-laden analysis might and indeed will result in an
expert-driven mockery of the truth-seeking process.
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APPENDIX
TWENTY QUESTIONS FOR ArToRNEys AND JUDGES
To ANSWER CONCERNING EXPERT TESTIMONY
When confronted with expert testimony of questionable validi-
ty, attorneys and judges should answer the following questions.
A "no" answer to any of these questions indicates that the court
should seriously consider excluding the expert testimony. If all
questions are answered "yes" or "not applicable," the court
should admit the expert testimony, unless some other legal
doctrine requires exclusion of the testimony.
1. Does the jury need expert testimony?
2. Is the witness qualified to serve as an expert?
3. Is the expert's testimony based upon valid science (or other
technical or specialized knowledge)?
a. Has the expert's theory or technique been. tested?
b. Has the expert's theory or technique been subjected to
peer review and publication?
c. Is the known or potential rate of error for the expert's
technique minimal?
d. Is the expert's theory or technique generally accepted
within the relevant professional community?
e. Did the expert's theory exist before litigation began?
4. Does the expert's theory or technique "fit" the facts of the
case?
5. Did the expert properly apply applicable standards?
6. Are the expert's assumptions reasonable?
7. Has the expert avoided mere speculation?
8. Did the expert adequately investigate the facts?
9. Is the expert's testimony relevant?
10. Does the expert avoid relying upon unproduced hearsay?
1998]
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11. Does the probative value of the expert's testimony out-
weigh its danger of unfair prejudice?
12. Does the probative value of the expert's testimony out-
weigh its danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury?
13. Does the probative value of the expert's testimony out-
weigh considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence?
14. Does the expert avoid impermissibly testifying about legal
opinions?
15. Does the expert avoid testifying about a criminal
defendant's mental state when it constitutes an element of the
crime or of the defense?
16. Does the expert avoid attempting to bolster the credibility
of other witnesses?
17. In a products liability design defect case, has the
plaintiffs design expert established the existence of an alterna-
tive feasible design?
18. Did the party offering the expert's testimony comply with
all discovery and other pretrial disclosure requirements?
19. Has the expert adequately explained the bases for her
opinion?
20. Is the expert offering something more than a r6sum6 and
an opinion?
